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ABSTRACT
STRATEGIC INVENTORIES IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH VERTICAL CONTROL AND
DOWNSTREAM COURNOT COMPETITION
by
Vijayendra Viswanathan
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Jaejin Jang
Strategic Inventory (SI) has been an area of increased interest in theoretical supply

chain literature recently. Most of the work so far however, has only considered a supply

chain without downstream competition between retailers. Competition is ubiquitous in
most market situations, hence, interactions between SI and retailer competition merits

study as a first step in bringing the conversations and insights from this stream of literature
to the real world.

We present here a two-period and a three-period model of one manufacturer

supplying an identical product to two retailers who form a Cournot duopoly. We also study
a Commitment contract, where the manufacturer commits to all the selling seasons’

wholesale prices at the beginning of the 1st period. Commitment contracts have been shown
to eliminate SI carriage over two selling seasons in the absence of retailer competition

(Anand et al. (2008)). We aim to deduce if this type of contract has the same effect in the
presence of downstream competition. We determine closed-form Nash Equilibrium

decision variable values for each of these models using game-theoretic modeling, a pricedependent linear demand function, and backward induction.

We find that, the introduction of downstream Cournot duopoly competition leads to
ii

lower profits for both the manufacturer and retailer. This holds, whether the number of
selling season is two or three. Consumer Surplus is also uniformly lower under retailer
competition, compared to a downstream monopoly supply chain.

When we try to deduce the effect of SI carriage under Cournot duopoly competition, by

comparing an SC with Cournot duopoly competition and SI allowed between periods, to a
similar SC with a Cournot duopoly downstream and a static, repeating, one-shot game in

each period, with no SI carried – we find again that manufacturer and retailer profits are

both lower when SI carriage is allowed. This holds whether the number of selling seasons is
two or three. Consumer Surplus is also lower uniformly over both two and three selling
seasons.

Under a Commitment contract, over two selling seasons, the manufacturer ends up

with an advantage, making a higher profit with downstream retailer competition, than

compared to supplying to a monopoly downstream under the same contract. The retailers,

while competing as a Cournot duopoly, are not able to use the relative advantage that comes
from a Commitment contract to make a higher profit, as they are, when the downstream is a
single retailer monopoly. The consumer also is disadvantaged by the introduction of
downstream Cournot competition under a Commitment contract.

When we compare a manufacturer supplying to a Cournot duopoly downstream of

retailers, with, and without a Commitment contract (dynamic ordering), we see that the

manufacturer and consumer benefit under a Commitment contract, making higher profits,
but the retailer is at a disadvantage.

It would be an interesting extension of this work to generalize the results from two

and three selling seasons, presented here, to the “n” period case. It would also be beneficial
iii

to run empirical studies in real-world supply chains to validate if and to what extent the insights developed by this kind of game-theoretic modeling hold in a real-world supply chain
setting. Development of contracts that are more effective than a Commitment contract in
coordinating this supply chain would be another possible area for further research.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Researchers have proposed various definitions of supply chains over the years.
Two examples are:

 A supply chain is a set of firms that passes materials forward (Lalonde and
Masters, 1994)

 Several independent firms are involved in manufacturing a product and placing it
in the hands of the end-user in a supply chain— raw material and component

producers, product assemblers, wholesalers, retailer merchants and transportation
companies, are all members of a supply chain (Lambert et al., 1998).

Inventory holding in supply chains is inevitable. Inventory helps smooth production

and demand uncertainty, transportation delays and price fluctuations. On the contrary,

inventory incurs holding costs (warehouse rental, administrative, refrigeration etc.), usually
expressed either as a per-unit cost or a fixed cost plus a per-unit cost, and hence, larger the
inventory, larger the holding cost. Due to these two competing effects of inventory,

determining the optimal amount of inventory to carry in a supply chain has been a topic of

active interest in supply chain research. A review of the relevant research in this area, both

from a single-decision maker optimization as well as game-theoretic (multiple independent
decision makers) approaches are summarized in sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this document
respectively.
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Economic competition is another important research area in business and

engineering literature since the 1800s. Seldom does one firm dominate a market and hence,
competition is an inevitable artifact of any free-market economic system. One of the most

basic and widely used economic competition models – the Cournot model dates back to the
18th century French philosopher and mathematician, Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-

1887) and is still used widely to model economic competition in various kinds of models,
due to its versatility and simplicity. Research on economic competition has typically
focused on expressing competitive scenarios found in the real world in terms of an

adequate model, either one of the standard competition models like Bertrand, Cournot and
Stackelberg, or a hybrid model that represents the real-world situation best. Research in

this area has focused on the interplay of control and incentives – situations where one of
the competing entities is in a position of strength compared to the others and then the

design of appropriate incentives to level the playing field – coordination, or the analysis of
different competitive scenarios – entry of a new firm into an established market, mergers

and acquisitions et al. A review of the standard economic competition models is presented
in section 2.3 of this document, and a review of the literature on inventory as a strategic
weapon is presented in section 2.4.

The focus of this work is the effect of competition on the retailers' tendencies to

carry strategic inventory into the subsequent period. Strategic inventories are inventories
carried by supply chain entities for purely strategic reasons, even in the absence of

“traditional” reasons to hold inventory. Traditional reasons for holding inventory at a

supply chain entity (e.g. Manufacturer, retailer, and distributor) have been economies of
scale in production, resulting in cycle inventories; to hedge against production or
2

distribution delays and ensure timely availability of goods, resulting in pipeline inventories;
inventories held as safety stock, to hedge against demand and supply uncertainty;

inventories held to hedge against price fluctuations, termed speculative inventory (Anand
et al., 2008); and inventories held to smooth production and thus lower production costs
(Holt et al., 1960) . Vertical control refers to an upstream supply chain entity controlling
one of the operating parameters of a downstream entity like price or inventory. In this

thesis, vertical control always implies price control, where an upstream manufacturer can
set a different wholesale price in each period, while supplying to two competing

downstream retailers, with multi-period ordering. Recent literature in the area of strategic
inventories in a supply chain with vertical control is reviewed in section 2.5 of this
document.

In Chapter three, we completely characterize and derive closed-form Nash equilibrium

decision variable values for a two and three-period model of one manufacturer supplying
identical product to a Cournot duopoly of retailers with SI carrying allowed between

periods. We formulate this problem as a dynamic game and derive closed-form equilibrium
decision variable values for both the manufacturer and retailers in every period. We

present comparative analyses of these two and three period models to two and three period
models with a monopoly downstream and a Static Cournot duopoly downstream to deduce
the effect of competition and Strategic Inventory respectively.

In Chapter four, we completely characterize and derive Nash equilibrium decision

variable values for a two period Cournot duopoly downstream model with SI, under a

“Commitment contract” where the manufacturer commits to the wholesale price for every
3

selling season, at the beginning of the first period itself. We then present comparative
analysis of this model to an identical model under Commitment contract, but with a

monopoly downstream and a dynamic 2-period Cournot duopoly model, to deduce the

effect of downstream competition under a Commitment contract, and the effectiveness of a
Commitment contract with a downstream Cournot duopoly respectively.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the management of supply chain processes, inventory management is challenging

because it directly impacts costs and service (Felea, 2008). Inventory is commonly seen as a
tradeoff between holding costs and service levels, and the efficient balancing of these two

competing parameters constitutes effective inventory management – keeping holding costs
low, while keeping service levels high enough to attract customers consistently.

Inventory decision making differs significantly with whether the supply chain is

centralized or decentralized. In a centralized supply chain, there is one decision maker and
the decisions of this entity are binding on all the other entities in the supply chain.
However, a decentralized supply chain is one where each supply chain entity –

manufacturer, retailer, intermediary are free to make their own operational decisions.

2.1 Supply chain inventory optimization under a single decision
maker
The news-vendor problem is a classic example of inventory theory focusing on

optimization under a single decision maker. It is typically characterized by fixed prices and
uncertain demand. It is named so, since it describes the dilemma faced by a newspaper
vendor, who needs to decide every morning how many newspapers to buy for the day

without knowing the characteristics of the demand. Also newspapers bought yesterday are

useless today, and will not be sold. By analogy, in a news-vendor problem, unsold product at
the end of each day is assumed to be disposed off at a salvage price s (s≥0).

5

The classical single-period news-vendor problem (SPP) is to find a product's order

quantity that maximizes the expected profit under probabilistic demand. The SPP model

assumes that if any inventory remains at the end of the period, a discount is used to sell it

or it is disposed (Khouja, 1999). Here, there is only one decision maker and a single selling

season. There are also various extensions to the classic problem that have been addressed
by various researchers over the years. One early example is Kabak and Schiff (1978) who
solve the news-vendor problem with the objective of profit-satisficing - maximizing the

probability of achieving a certain target profit. Petruzzi and Dada (1999) summarize and

critique of several works related to the news-vendor model, with parameters like demand
and selling price, being endogenously supplied, in contrast to traditional news-vendor
models, where these parameters are exogenous to the model.

In more recent research, Boute et al. (2006) consider a two-echelon supply chain

with a single retailer that holds finished goods inventory to meet independent, identically
distributed (i.i.d) customer demand and a manufacturer that produces the goods on a

made-to-order basis. They show that by including the impact of the retailer's order decision
on lead times, the order pattern can be smoothed to a considerable extent without

increasing stock levels. This reduces inventory and hence inventory costs. In more recent

research, Lam and Ip (2011) integrate the concept of customer satisfaction into inventory

management and a “customer satisfaction inventory” model which integrates probabilistic

concepts of Markov chains to abstract the value of retention vs. migration of customers as a
decision variable into an inventory model such that the replenishment inventory level can

be tailored to future expected customer demand without keeping excessive inventory. This
6

represents one of the first attempts to couple inventory levels with customer satisfaction
directly.

The overarching theme in these models is that they focus on optimization under a

single decision maker and hence incentives to either hold or not hold inventory. Specific
incentive schemes to discourage/encourage holding of inventory are not discussed.

2.2 Game-theoretic inventory modeling

Cachon and Zipkin (1999) compare competitive and collaborative inventory policies

in a two-stage supply chain with stationary stochastic demand, where inventory holding

costs are charged at each stage and back-orders incur a penalty. They propose two gametheoretic models – one in which the firms track their echelon inventories and another in

which they track only local inventories and compare the optimal policies chosen in either
scenario. The optimal policy in the competitive case (each firm only watches local

inventory) minimizes every agent's inventory costs whereas an optimal policy in the

cooperative scenario (each firm watches echelon inventory) minimizes the cost of the

entire supply chain. They show that competition reduces supply chain efficiency and that a
system-optimal solution can be achieved as a Nash Equilibrium by using a linear transfer

payment scheme. They develop a set of optimal transfer payment schemes based on easily
verifiable metrics like inventory and back-orders that eliminate incentives to deviate and

achieve a supply chain efficiency level comparable to the cooperative equilibrium. Chen et
al. (2009) analyze the cost/benefit allocation among several retailers in various inventory
centralization games (Distribution System with multiple retailers who can place joint

orders and place inventory in a central warehouse location). Unlike previous related work
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like Chen and Zhang (2006) and Slikker et al. (2005), this work assumes that the pricing

decision is endogenous. They employ convex programming techniques to prove that there

exists at least one feasible allocation that cannot be improved upon, (non-empty core) in an
inventory centralization game with price-dependent linear demand. Bichescu and Fry

(2009) analyze a decentralized supply chain following a periodic review (Q, R) inventory
policy with a VMI arrangement. They explore the division of channel power between the

different agents by analyzing 3 different models – one model of SC with a powerful supplier
that can influence the decision-making process, a second with a powerful retailer and a
third where both have approximately equal power, by modeling the powerful agent

scenarios as a Stackelberg game where either agent moves first, and the third scenario as a
simultaneous move game. They show that merely opting for a VMI arrangement leads to
savings, irrespective of the power scenario.

In all this literature, inventory has been viewed as a parameter that needs to be

optimized in different ways to positively impact supply chain efficiency and profits–

centralization, VMI, optimization under a single decision-maker to maximize or minimize

an operational parameter like total profit or cost respectively, game-theoretic perspectives

to address decentralized decision-making, incentives to promote equilibria that benefit the
entire supply chain vs. any single agent etc. None of the papers reviewed in the previous
two sections view inventory as conferring a strategic advantage to any agent. The

traditional view has always been that inventory incurs a holding cost and hence is a liability
that needs to be minimized, or at least managed efficiently with a holding cost trade-off to

act as a hedge against uncertain supply and/or demand, channel delays etc. However, there
is an entire line of literature that views inventory as a strategic weapon and then a further
8

line of developing literature that extends this notion from economics to supply chains,

exploring the strategic value of inventory in supply chains. We review these two strands of

literature in the following two sections and posit that this thesis furthers the emerging line
of research in the latter strand –strategic role of inventories in supply chains.

2.3 Classic economic competition models

The Miriam-Webster dictionary defines competition as, "the effort of two or more

parties acting independently to secure the business of a third-party by offering the most
favorable terms." There are various basic economic competition models that are usually

used in the literature (for simplicity of analysis), to model various competition scenarios in
the real-world.

Some of the most important ones are:
Cournot competition: Cournot competition is an economic model where companies

compete on the amount of output they will produce, which they decide independently of

each other and simultaneously. It is named after Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877). A

key assumption of this model is the Cournot Conjecture which states that each firm aims to
maximize profits, based on the expectation that its own output decision will not have an
effect on the decisions of its rivals.

Stackelberg competition: Stackelberg competition model is used to describe a situation

where one of the firms in a market, has a natural advantage over the other competing firms
and makes the first move, ahead of the other players. This firm is called the Stackelberg

Leader. The advantage the Stackelberg leader firm holds over the other firms in the market
9

(followers) could be due to the fact that the leader held a monopoly in the market and the

followers are new entrants. It could also be based on other forms of leadership of one firm
over others in an Oligopoly, like, the leader firm holding excess inventory, which helps it to

make a production decision before the other firms in the market. This form of competition
is named after the German economist Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg who published

Market Structure and Equilibrium (Marktform und Gleichgewicht) in 1934 which described
the model.

Bertrand competition: Bertrand competition is a model of competition used in economics,
named after the French economist Joseph Louis François Bertrand (1822-1900). It is

fundamentally different from the Cournot and Stackelberg models of economic competition
described previously in that, firms do not compete over output quantity, but act as pricesetters i.e., they set prices at which each firm is going to sell goods in the market,

simultaneously, and each firm is assumed to produce/be able to procure enough product to
meet end-customer demand at that price point. Also, this is a simultaneous-ordering
situation like the Cournot model and unlike the Stackelberg model.

1.4 Inventory as a strategic weapon

Inventories as a strategic weapon has been frequently studied in economic literature

for over 30 years now and more recently from a marketing perspective (operations-

marketing interface). Murphy, Toman and Weiss (1989) represents one of the first attempts
at a game-theoretic model of oil market disruption and the role of «inventory stock-piling»
in this environment. Rotemberg and Saloner (1989), analyzes the role of inventories in

supporting collusion between supply chain entities. The model considered in this paper is
10

that of duopoly retailers, who themselves are the producers, selling product over two

consecutive seasons with inventory carrying being allowed between seasons. The demand
function considered is price-dependent linear. One of the key intuitions they derive from
the model is that, when demand is high, there is increased incentive to deviate from

implicitly collusive arrangement, so there is increased strategic inventory carrying by the
two retailers. Balachander and Farquhar (1994) represent an early attempt in the

operations-marketing interface literature that considers the strategic value of a particular
inventory strategy. In this case, they reason that though a firm might lose from foregone
sales in case of a stockout, it might indirectly also benefit from the higher price a

competititor is able to charge. They thus argue that customers are more prone to search

elsewhere for a product upon encountering a stockout, from this reduced price-competition
between the firms. This would then provide an incentive for competing firms to actually

induce stockouts (deliberately stocking less) thereby resulting in inventory now acquiring a
strategic dimension.

Matsumura(2002) similarly studies inventories as a strategic weapon, but from the

standpoint of it used as a co-ordinating device in a duopoly, competing-retailer

environment. Matsumura's model is a finitely repeated competition model with a finite

number of selling seasons through which inventory carrying is allowed, as opposed to the

more restrictive one-shot, two-selling season model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1989). One
of the important insights derived in this paper is that, if a firm deviates from collusive

behavior, the rival increases it's inventories to punish the deviator. Large inventory holding
by the punishing firm effectively makes it the Stackelberg leader, forcing the defecting firm

to follow. In this situation, the second mover's equilibrium optimal strategies, always place
11

it at a disadvantage compared to the punishing firm and hence inventory holding acts as a
strategic deterrent to firms taking non cooperative actions. The two competing firms are
allowed to carry inventory at any given point in time,only one period forward.

Mollgaard, Poddar and Sasaki (2000) analyze the strategic role of inventories in a

competing retailer environment. Their analysis again looks at the "strategic value" of

inventory, from yet another angle - strategic inventory carrying allowing a firm to raise it's
latter period output. Using a two-period model, they establish that the strategic value of

inventories depend on the convexity of the cost function, on the cost of storage, and on the
slopes of each firm's individual supply schedules. This makes their analysis more granular
than earlier attempts. In addition to exploring what kind of strategic role inventories can
play in a competing-retailer environment, they establish explicitly, factors that affect the
strategic value of inventory in such situations.

In summary, all these attempts at analyzing the strategic value of inventories do so,

in the sense of inventories giving one of the firms a strategic edge over the other in a

competitive environment, or inventory carrying either aiding or abetting collusive behavior
in a cooperative environment. All of the above models assume that the producer himself is
the seller of the goods and the supply chain angle is explicitly absent from this strand of
literature.

12

Table 2.1 Summary of literature on inventory as a strategic weapon
Author (Year)
Murphy et al.
(1989)

Types of strategic roles
analyzed for inventory

Types of competition
Models Considered

Vertical control
present?

Single period/Multiperiod?

Number
of players

Stockpiling by entities

Simultaneous move

No

Single Period

N-player

Simultaneous move

No

Two Period

N-player
oligopoly

Monopoly,
Simultaneous move

No

Single Period

n-player
oligopoly

Punish firms that deviate
Rotermberg &
from a collusive
Saloner (1989)
arrangement.
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Balachander &
Farquhar
(1994)

Strategically inducing
stock-out

Mollgaard et
al. (2000)

Allow firm to raise its
latter period output

Simultaneous move

No

Matsumura
(2002)

Firm can commit to
larger sales in a later
period – encourages
firms to take collusive
action

Cournot competition

No

Two-period

Two-period

two-player

two-player

2.5 Strategic inventories in supply chains

One of the most significant works in this area is Anand et al. (2008), who conjecture

among other things that strategic inventories are optimal for a wide range of contractual
structures in an n-period ordering environment, first for markets with price-dependent

linear end demand as well as later for, arbitrary demand functions. This is the case, even

when all the traditional reasons for holding inventory at a supply chain entity do not exist.
Traditional reasons for holding inventory are demand uncertainty, pipeline delays in
getting the product from producer to end consumer on time, economies of scale in

production and distribution and such other factors. Throughout their models they assume
that the nature of end-demand is known and replenishment is instantaneous, no backordering exists and production costs are the same across periods, but still prove that

inventory carriage between periods is optimal in certain cases and make the important

argument that design of coordinating supply chain contracts has to take the possibility of
strategic inventory carriage into account.

Keskinocak et al. (2008) extend the two-period model proposed by Anand et al.

(2008) to case where the manufacturer's first period capacity is limited, thereby analyzing
the effect of strategic inventory carriage in a capacitated production environment. Zhang,
Natarajan and Sosic (2008) extend the two period model from Anand et al. (2008) to the

case with asymmetric information in an n-period model. Their key assumption is that the

inventory level of the retailer from the previous period is invisible to the supplier, when the

supplier is setting his wholesale price for the period. This is different from the other related
efforts in analyzing the impact of strategic inventories in a vertically-controlled supply
14

chain. All the previous studies (Anand et al. 2008, Keskinocak et al. 2008) assume full

information at all stages and time-periods of the game. They analyze the kind of contracts
that can minimize the informational advantage the retailer has in this scenario (by not
sharing the inventory information with the manufacturer)

These papers are the first to analyze the effect of strategic inventories in a supply

chain. Strategic inventory carriage as a part of single-echelon inventory games among

market competitors have been analyzed before in the literature by papers like Rotemberg
and Saloner (1989), but a key difference to Anand et al. (2008) is the absence of vertical

control, or a multi-echelon supply chain with procurement from an upstream manufacturer.
In previous economics literature, typically, the producer himself is the seller in the market.
Krishnan and Winter (2007) propose a scheme of joint price and inventory control

in a one-manufacturer, two-retailer supply chain where the retailers compete as

differentiated duopolists under uncertain demand. They find that a combination of a buy-

back contract with a resale price ceiling leads to maximization of joint profits. This work is
close, but different to the work presented in the thesis. A very crucial differentiator is the
fact that we do not focus on joint price and inventory control. In our model, inventory
decisions are taken independently by the retailers and the role of strategy inventory

carrying by retailers acting independently is explored, for its interaction with price-control
and retailer competition.

Another recent work in the area, Desai, Koenigsberg and Purohit (2010) focus on the

effects of forward buying by retailers and proves that the motivations for forward buying
are more complex than just manufacturer trade promotions or that retailer stock piling
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only helps the retailer but hurts the manufacturer (a view shared by Anand (2008) who

subsequently develop co-ordinating contracts to remedy this inequality). This work adds to
the model considered by Anand (2008), the possibility of manufacturer trade promotions

as well as uncertain demand and find that, regardless of whether the manufacturer offers a
trade promotion, forward buying can be beneficial, both to the retailer and the

manufacturer. They also consider a competitive model with two retailers facing identical

but different demand functions and that the retailers are differentiated (they aren't selling
the same end-product). Also, they find that, in the case of uncertain demand, strategic

forward buying is encouraged and find that the retailer orders a quantity higher than they
expect to sell, even in the most optimistic demand scenario. This work further bolsters
evidence that inventory can play a strategic role in the supply chain in some very
interesting ways that merit more careful research and analysis.

Hartwig, et al. (2015) present an experimental study on the effect of SI on supply

chain performance. They show that the positive effects of SI are more pronounced than

theoretically predicted – reducing average wholesale prices and the double marginalization
effect which leads to benefits for both manufacturer and retailer alike in a one-

manufacturer, one-retailer SC two selling seasons. Downstream competition is not
considered.
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Table 2.2 Summary of literature on Strategic inventories in a supply chain
Author (year)
Krishnan and
Winter (2007)

Vertical control Competititve
Type of demand
Number Co-ordinating
Present?
downstream present? functions Considered of periods contracts developed?
Yes

Yes

Uncertain demand

Yes

No

Price-dependent linear, 2 period,
general
n-period

Yes

Keskinocak (2008) Yes

No

Price-dependent linear 2-period

Yes

No

Anand (2008)

Single
period

Yes

Yes. 2 manufacturer one
retailer and one
manufacturer 2-retailer
configurations

Viswanathan and
Jang (2009)

Yes

Viswanathan and
Jang (2010)

Yes

Yes, Cournot Competing Price-dependent linear, 2-period
downstream duopoly
depending on the total
quantity on sale in the
market in the given
period.
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Desai et al. (2010)

Uncertain, price2-period
dependent linear,
depending on only the
particular retailer's
prior retail price

Yes, Stackelberg
Price-dependent
2-period
Competing downstream linear,depending on the
duopoly
total quantity on sale
in the market in the
given period.

Yes

No

No

2.6. Game Theory in supply chains

Game theory is a powerful tool used to analyze situations where there are multiple

players (“agents” or “stake-holders”) and each stake-holder’s payoff is affected by the

decisions of the other players. It is easy to see that a supply chain can easily be cast into a

game theoretic model, since it typically contains retailers, distributors, manufacturers all of
whom make different kinds of strategic, tactical and operational decisions that can have a

direct effect on the strategic, tactical and operational decisions of every other entity in the
supply chain. This fact has led to a lot of game theoretic concepts being used to analyze

supply chains and evolve coordination mechanisms, determine optimal decisions for each
party and such other things.

One of the most important reviews that covers a lot of significant work in the use of

game theoretic techniques in supply chain analysis was Cachon and Netessine (2003). This

work introduces the basics of game theory that apply to supply chain research and reviews

in fair detail and an accessible format, a set of game theoretic tools that have been used/can
be used in future to analyze supply chain problems. Most of the review focuses on static,
non-cooperative, non-zero sum games.

In the following, we provide an introduction to some key game theoretic concepts

that are essential to understanding the analytical techniques used in this dissertation.
Basic definitions, results and concepts: (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991)
1. Strategic form game: Strategic form games have three elements
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 A set of players i ∈ I
 The Pure Strategy Profile (Si) for each player i
 Payoff Functions ui that give the player i's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility ui(s) for
each profile s = (s1, s2, s3,...,sI)

 Each player's objective is to maximize his own pay-off function.
2. Pure strategy: A pure strategy is a predetermined plan of action in a game of which
strategy to choose, from a strategy profile, after considering all the strategies from
the profile.

3. Mixed strategy: A mixed strategy (σi) can be considered a probability distribution
over pure strategies. Each player’s randomization is statistically independent of
those of his opponents and the payoffs to a profile of mixed strategies are the
expected values of the corresponding pure-strategy payoffs.

4. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a profile of strategy such that each player’s strategy is

an optimal response to other players’ strategies. A mixed strategy profile σ* is Nash
Equilibrium if, for all players i, ui (σ*i, σ*-i) >= ui (si , σ*-i) for all si ∈ Si

5. A Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium is a pure strategy satisfying the above
condition.

6. Strict Nash equilibrium: A Nash Equilibrium is strict (Harsanyi, 1973), if each

player has a best response to his rivals’ strategies. i.e., s* is a strict NE if u(s i*, s-i*) >
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u(si, s*-i) for all i and si ≠si* . By definition, a strict Nash Equlibrium is a pure strategy
Nash Equlibrium.

7. Domination of strategies: Pure strategy si is strictly dominated for player i if there
exists si’ ∈ i such that ui(si’, s-i) > ui(si, s-i) for all s-i ∈ S-i

8. Iterated elimination of pure strategies: When one round of elimination of strictly

dominated strategies yields a unique strategy profile s* =(s 1*,s2*,….si*), this strategy
profile is necessarily a Nash equilibrium.

9. Pareto optimality: Given a set of alternative allocations of, say, goods or income for
a set of individuals, a change from one allocation to another that can make at least
one individual better off without making any other individual worse off is called a
Pareto improvement. An allocation is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal when no
further Pareto improvements can be made.

2.7 Multiple Nash Equilibria in Games

The problem of selecting one unique Nash Equilibrium from many possible ones has

been a pertinent problem for researchers for years now. There are many situations in a
game theoretic setting, where there are multiple possible Nash Equilibria. This poses a

problem, especially in real-world applications. E.g., Consider a supply chain Game where

the Inventory level at a manufacturer and retailer needs to be decided. If we solve this game
using backward induction and find that there are multiple possible equilibrium inventory
values at each entity, then we face a dilemma as to which of these values to use, while
physically setting inventory levels.
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There are many approaches to deal with the problem of multiple Nash equilibria.

One of the more common ones is to seek a mixed strategy equilibrium (a randomization

over the multiple pure strategies) in cases where there are multiple pure strategy equilibria
possible. Though this approach is simple and elegant, and yields one mixed strategy

equilibrium, when presented with multiple pure strategy equilibria, it is not useful while

modeling for real-world applications, since it would be meaningless to say that the optimal
inventory value for a supply chain entity would be 70 units 10% of the time and 40 units
30% of the time, randomly.

Researchers have always been interested in various creative approaches to this

problem ever since John Nash's seminal work introducing the notion of the Nash
Equilibrium, in 1950.

One of the approaches is to choose a Nash Equilibrium randomly from the multiple

available equilibria. Bjorn and Vuong (1984) present one such model where they choose a
Nash Equilibrium among many, randomly. They analyze the econometric decision of a

husband and wife to participate or not in the labor force, together and model the behavior
of this couple, using a game-theoretic framework. They distinguish their work from the

previous efforts on this problem in that, the previous efforts all considered the husband's

decision to work or not work, as exogenous to the model, but the authors here assume this
decision happens within the framework of the problem itself. Another contribution of this

work is that they assume a utility function that specifies the labor supply of a husband and
wife using individual utility functions in contrast to previous work that specifies the labor
supply of a husband and wife from the outcome of a joint utility function. In other words,
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the decisions of the husband and wife are not independent and the decision of the husband
has an impact on the utility function of the wife and vice-versa. They find that there exist

multiple Nash equilibria to this game. i.e., both people not participating in the workforce as

well as both people simultaneously participating are both Nash equilibria. They resolve this
situation by proposing that the probability of occurrence of each of these pairs of outcome
(equilibria) is distributed according to certain weights and provide a log-likelihood
function formulation for estimating these weights and probabilities.

An approach that is a little more sophisticated than random choosing is one of

choosing extremal equilibria. Jia (2008) develops game-theoretic models quantify the

impact of national discount chains on the proﬁtability and entry and exit decisions of small
retailers from the late 1980 to the late 1990s. He also examines the entry decisions of a
small chain of stores vs just a single store, thereby relaxing the assumption that the

entry/exit decision of a particular store is independent of the entry/exit decision of every
other simultaneous entrant. They find that Walmart's expansion from the late 80s to the
90s explains about 40-50% of the net change in the number of small discount retailers,
during that period. They remark that modeling the entry decisions of a chain of retail

stores, as opposed to one store causes the profits of the stores to be spatially related. This
leads to huge problem sizes – they cite an example with the entry decision that has 2 2000

choices for a market size of 2000 stores. They encounter multiple equilibria, while solving
for a Nash equilibrium to this entry game and solve this by transforming the profit-

maximization problem into a search for fixed points of the necessary conditions. This

transformed problem then has much smaller dimensions than 2 2000 and is now much easier
to solve for a Nash equilibrium. They solve for a Nash equilibrium in this situation using a
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search technique that relies on the super-modularity property of games. A super-modular

game is one in which the marginal utility of increasing a player's strategy increases with the
increase of other player's strategies. In other words, the best response of each player is a
non-decreasing function of other players' strategies.

Tamer (2003) studies a bi-variate (only two decision choices per player),

simultaneous response model, which is a stochastic representation of the equilibria in a
two-person game. He finds that, in this situation there are multiple equilibria and

categorize the approaches taken by previous works on similar models (with multiple

equilibria) into two classes – incomplete and incoherent models. Incomplete models are

ones where the model predicts a non-unique outcome that maps to a certain region of the

exogenous variables. They observe that researchers dealing with these models have either
made simplifying assumptions such that the outcome space changes, or impose ad-ho
selection mechanisms in the regions of multiplicity. The author studies these kind of

incomplete models in the regions that exhibit multiplicity of equilibria. Using restrictions

on the probabilities of the non-unique outcomes and by identifying the parameters in the
model that can be consistently estimated, the authors develop a maximum likelihood
estimator for the parameters and hence resolve the multiplicity problem.

Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) develop empirical models of market structure from

qualitative choice models of a firm's entry decision into a market. These models assume

that the author does not observe market entrant's revenues or costs but draw inferences

from a firm's unobservable profits that describe potential entrants' strategies. They then

use these models to study the market concentration in retail markets for new automobiles,
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thus determining the entry strategy for a new entrant into the market. They find that there
exist multiple Nash equilibria that make it impossible in this situation to use qualitative

choice models. They overcome this situation by reinterpreting their game theoretic model

from one that predicts the individual choices of each of the entrants to one that predicts the
total number of entrants in the market, in which case, they find, there exist unique Nash

Equilibria. This is an example of another approach used in a situation with multiple Nash
equilibria is to recast the game such that there exists a unique equilibrium. They also find

that recasting the game as a sequential decision game, rather than simultaneous move, also
eliminates the problem of multiple Nash equilibria. They argue that this decision also

makes physical sense because one can always think of entry decisions of firms in a market

happening one after another, and not all at the same time. Another similar example is Berry
(1992) who present a market entry model for the airline industry. Here also, they

encounter the problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria for firms' entry/exit decisions. Here too,
they try to recast the game to model the number of new entrants (and not the identities of

the individual entrants) versus a model that tries to predict each firm's entry/exit decisions
based on the decisions of the other potential entrants. They find that this recast game has a
unique equilibrium, and thus they are able to deal with the situation where multiple Nash

equilibria exist. Lung (2010) presents an alternative to all these methods discussed above,
using the Nash Ascendancy Relation. They postulate that if a strategy profile x dominates a
strategy profile y, it can be said that strategy x is more stable (closer to equilibrium) than
strategy y. In this case, it can be said that x Nash Ascends y and is more likely to be a Nash
Equilibrium than y. By formulating an iterative method that does an approximate

computation of how many strategies, each strategy in a strategy space ascends, they
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propose a method to compute a unique Nash equilibrium for a game. In summary, all of
these works, represent various methods and approaches to choose a single Nash

equilibrium in a situation where there exist multiple possible equilibria. It can be seen that
this is still an open research area and none of the methods proposed above provide a

definite or fool-proof way of choosing one Nash equilibrium from many available choices

and the final decision of method followed depends on the problem on hand, the objectives
of the research (whether recasting the problem in a different way still fulfills the research

objectives), time constraints (that prohibit computationally costly algorithms), amount of
accuracy required etc., and hence the technique used has to be tailored specifically to the
problem on hand, based on the unique characteristics of the problem, most of the time.

2.8 Supply chain coordination with contracts

In a supply chain, operational decisions of the individual entities are usually made,

keeping in mind, only their own best interest and these interests need not always be the
same as the best interests of the supply chain as a whole (Cachon et al., 2003). Optimal

supply chain performance can be achieved if firms coordinate by contracting on a set of
transfer payments that align each firm's objective to the supply chain objective. This
mechanism is termed decentralized supply chain coordination using contracts.

In the following paragraphs, we review some of the important contracts found in

recent supply chain literature (Cachon et al., 2003).


Wholesale price contract: With a wholesale price contract, the supplier charges the

retailer a fixed price w per-unit of product purchased. Lavaliere and Porteus (2001)
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analyze a wholesale price contract in the context of the news-vendor model. They

consider a manufacturer producing a single good at a marginal cost c which is sold
at the fixed retail price r>c. Salvage value is assumed to be zero. A single selling
season is assumed with demand drawn from a continuous distribution Φ, with

density φ. Unmet demand (stock-out) is assumed to be lost, resulting in lost margin

to the retailer but without any additional stock-out penalty. The manufacturer is the
Stackelberg leader, presenting the wholesale price w that the retailer can either
accept or reject. An optimal contract in this situation is one that maximizes the

manufacturer's profit subject to the retailer's acceptance. The retailer accepts any
terms that allow an expected profit greater than zero (the model does not assume

any opportunity cost). This model does not consider supplier competition, retailer

power and retailer pricing policies that affect wholesale prices in the real world. The
authors show that manufacturer's profit and sales quantity increase (mostly) with
increase in market size but the resulting wholesale price depends on how the
market grows. They also show that, if the market becomes more variable, the

retailer becomes more price-sensitive and hence the wholesale price decreases.
Gerchak and Wang (2004) show that in assembly systems (where multiple

components need to be mated together to form the finished retail product) with

random demand. They find, among other things that the wholesale price contract is

inferior to the revenue sharing contract, as the number of suppliers increase, in the
case of assembly systems. Using an Exponential demand distribution, they provide

an example for which the VMI with revenue sharing dominates the wholesale price

contract, with a single supplier. Unlike in Lariviere and Porteus (2001), here, unsold
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items are returned to the manufacturer for a pre-arranged price. In this model, the
component lot sizes (Qi) are selected by the manufacturers (suppliers) and the

assembly quantity (Qo) is chosen by the assembler. A basic revenue-sharing contract
as described in this paper specifies that, for each unit of final product sold, the

assembler pays supplier i, αi i=1, 2, 3 ...n and 0< αi<1, out of the total $1 of revenue.
That revenue sharing scheme is clearly known to suppliers. So, the model

considered in this paper is a full information game. The wholesale price contract
considered here is a multiple-supplier generalization of the model described in
Lariviere and Porteus (2001), reviewed above. Recent research on the use of

wholesale price contracts in supply chains continues to innovate on the type of

markets considered, types of incentives researched and types of insights gained – all
with a simple wholesale price type arrangement. Case in point is Hu and Gan (2010)
who research the impact of credit on stimulating demand and hence study a

wholesale price contract model of a supply chain with “credit sale”. They find that if
suppliers provide retailer with credit (incentive to increase sales) and the retailers
only provide account sales (no credit), this scenario improves the overall supply
chain performance.


Buyback contract: A buyback contract is one where the retailer buys the product
from the supplier at a unit price w but the supplier pays the retailer b per unit

remaining at the end of season. The model assumes that the retailer can never profit
from the leftover inventory (and hence the “buy-back” is a legitimate incentive) i.e.,

≥ always. Another important assumption in these contracts is that the supplier

is able to verify the number of units remaining at the end of each selling season.
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Padmanabhan and Png (1995) study the strategic effects of retailer returns policies
on competing retailers. In this work, show that when there is no uncertainty in
demand, a returns policy induces retailers to compete more intensely, since it

reduces retail prices without affecting wholesale prices, which serves to reduce

retailer profits leaving manufacturer margins intact. When demand is uncertain

though, they find that a returns policy induces the retailer to overstock, reducing the
upstream manufacturer profits. Emmons and Gilbert (1998) also focus on the

strategic effects of returns policies that provide for conditions under which a retailer
can return unsold merchandise for a full or partial refund from the supplier, and the
role such a policy can play in aligning the self-interested behavior of the retailer

with the best interests of a manufacturer. They opine that these kinds of policies are
often used to encourage larger orders from retailers, of style goods, which are
characterized by uncertain demand, long production times and short selling

seasons. A key assumption of this model is that the retailer sticks to one profit-

maximizing retail price through the selling season (as opposed to related work like

Gallego and vanRyzin (1994) who consider the prospect of the retailer being able to
change the retail price in the middle of the selling season). Like the recent research
on wholesale price contracts, the research on buy-back contracts has also tended
towards more innovative and interesting variations of these inherently simple

contracts. E.g.: Hou et al. (2010) who study a buyback contract between a buyer and
a backup supplier, when the buyer's main supplier experiences supply disruptions.

The primary source in this model is assumed to be cheaper than the backup source.
They solve for the optimal backup supplier return price and the buyer's optimal
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order quantity and deduce among other things that if the disruption probability

increases (both the probability of demand and supply uncertainty), it is better for

the buyer to order more from the backup supplier till the supply meets demand and
in this scenario, the buyer's expected profit decreases whereas that of the backup

supplier increases. Also, they deduce that the optimal order quantity for the buyer
under supply uncertainty is larger than under demand uncertainty, but the total
expected profit of the buyer and supplier combined is larger under supply

uncertainty than demand uncertainty, especially when the supply disruption
probability is large.


Revenue sharing contract: In a revenue sharing contract the supplier charges wr per
unit purchased plus the retailer shares a percentage of his revenue, back with the
supplier. Cachon and Lariviere (2000) analyze revenue sharing contracts for the

video rental industry. They show that a revenue sharing contract co-ordinates the
supply chain consisting of one manufacturer supplying to a retailer, in both

deterministic and stochastic demand situations. They also show that a revenue
sharing contract can coordinate a news-vendor style supply chain with price-

dependent demand, while a buy-back contract cannot. Wang et al. (2004) study a

consignment contract with revenue sharing, in which, akin to VMI, a supplier decides
on a retail price and delivery quantity and retains ownership of the goods. For each
item of goods sold, the retailer then deducts a certain percentage amount from the
selling price and returns the balance to the supplier. This kind of arrangement, the

authors opine, serves to shift the risk of inventory ownership from the retailer to the
supplier, in contrast to a wholesale price-contract, discussed in the earlier section,
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where the inventory risk is concentrated wholly at the hands of the retailer. Hence,

this kind of contract is more advantageous to the retailer when demand uncertainty
is high, since he can order exactly how much he needs, depending on how much

information he has about demand in the forthcoming selling season. Dana and Spier
(2001) consider a related model of an upstream firm that sells a good to a

downstream firm who then resell it or rent It for one period (video cassette rental

industry). Perfect competition is assumed and the supplier offers a contract {t,r} to
the retailers where t is the transfer price per unit of good sold to the retailer and r
is the royalty percent of total revenue that the retailers each share with the

manufacturer. They consider two models of this kind in which the upstream firm

(supplier) has an interest in softening price-competition between the downstream
competing retailers and show that revenue-sharing contracts used with a linear
input price leads to increased vertical integration (increased control of the
downstream retailers' operating parameters by the upstream firm).


The quantity flexibility contract: A quantity flexibility contract is one where the

supplier charges the retailer w per unit of product purchased and compensates the

retailer for unsold units left over after the selling season. Tsay et al. (1999) provide a
comprehensive framework for a quantity flexibility contract in a supply chain

consisting of one manufacturer supplying to a downstream retailer. Tsay opines

here that the quantity flexibility contract fulfils a specific niche in a typical supply
chain – the scenario of a customer that provides a planning forecast of intended

purchase for the next selling season, but does not commit to a specific quantity. In

this kind of situation, the customer has incentive to over-forecast to ensure adequate
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supply, but the supplier now bears the risk of over-production. With a quantity

flexibility contract, the supplier agrees to supply up to a certain percentage above
the forecast quantity, in return for the retailer's promise to not buy anything less
than a certain percentage below the forecast quantity. Under this contract, the

retailer relays an order quantity forecast to the manufacturer much before the start
of the selling season. He then places his final order, just before the selling season

starts, based on an updated demand signal. Market demand occurs and is fulfilled by
the retailer to the extent possible, based on this order quantity and retailer surplus,
if any, is salvaged. Li and Kouvelis (1999) study a similar quantity flexibility

contracts but of two primary types – a time inflexible contract that requires the

retailer to not only specify the order quantity, but also the exact time of the ordering
decision and a time flexible contract which eases the temporal limitation of the
earlier case and permits ordering of a specific order quantity anytime within a

mutually agreed time window. They also consider the situation of pure quantity

flexibility – the ability to order a different quantity at any point in time. They claim

to incorporate risk-sharing in the model by providing for the supplier being able to
charge a different price each time, based on the time of the order and the quantity

ordered. They derive the optimal time and order quantity decisions for the retailer

and conclude that contractual flexibility in sourcing decisions can effectively reduce
sourcing costs in an environment of price uncertainty. Lian and Deshmukh (2009)

study quantity flexibility contracts that are a little more sophisticated than the ones
studied by Tsay (2001) and Li and Kouvelis (1999). In this work, the time horizon

between the initial demand forecast and the start of the selling season, is treated as
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a continuous opportunity for the retailer to place an order, whenever the retailer is

comfortable placing a firm one. The further in advance the order is placed, the larger
the discount the retailer gets. The retailer is also given the opportunity here to
update quantities for future rolling time horizons at any time, but he pays a

premium for the incremental units. The paper develops heuristics for optimal order
quantity and timing decisions for the retailer in this situation and evaluates the

efficacy of different strategies possible under this contract, for optimal profit. One

important limiting assumption in this work is that the retailer can only increase his
order quantity for future periods at the present time, he can never decrease it.

Relaxing this assumption might affect the insights drawn on optimal strategies using
this contract, considerably. Shi and Chen (2008) study quantity flexibility contracts
with satisficing objectives, by assuming that supply chain agents are risk-averse,

rather than neutral, as assumed by most of the previous analyses. With satisficing

objectives, the goal is to maximize the probability of achieving a certain target. They
obtain contracts based on the Pareto optimality criterion, which is again different
from the Nash Equilibrium criterion usually used to derive optimal contract

parameters. The authors setup a definition of a Pareto contract as: “Within a

contractual form, a contract is said to be Pareto if its parameter set is Pareto, that is,

there does not exist an alternative parameter set such that no agent is worse off and at
least one agent is strictly better off.” They also note that Pareto contracts do not coordinate a supply chain, because there is one agent that is always strictly better off
than other agents and for a contract to coordinate a supply chain, we need that the
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optimal actions of the agents under the contract lead to pareto optimality for the
supply chain, as a whole, and not any individual agent.


Sales rebate contract: A sales rebate contract is one where the supplier charges the

retailer w per unit of product purchased, but gives the retailer a rebate r per unit of

product sold above a threshold t. Taylor (2002) considers two kinds of channel sales
rebates – linear and target rebates. A linear rebate is one where a rebate is paid for
every unit sold and a channel rebate where a rebate is paid only for every unit sold

beyond a target level. In this work, they deduce that when demand is not influenced
by sales effort, a properly designed channel rebate achieves channel coordination

and leads to a win-win outcome. They also note that an implementable coordination
mechanism cannot be developed using just linear rebates. Another significant
observation the authors make in the paper is that a rebate is distinct from an

upfront reduction in the wholesale price (discount), since the rebate is realized only
after the item is sold by the retailer. They observe that rebates are used primarily in
industries like computer hardware characterized by high demand variability and

short cycle times. Wong, Qi and Leung (2009) look at how sales rebate contracts coordinate supply chains. They consider a two-echelon supply chain with one vendor
supplying to multiple retailers with a VMI arrangement. They argue that VMI
actually facilitates a sales rebate contract, since with a VMI arrangement, the

retailers' real-time inventory information is available to the vendor. They show that,
with this kind of arrangement – sales rebate contract under a VMI mechanism, the

retailers achieve perfect coordination, i.e., retailers acting strategically to maximize
their best interest can also make price decisions to maximize the aggregate supply
33

chain profit. They claim that the proper rebate contract makes retailers lower their
prices to system-optimal prices, which increases demand and hence aggregate

supply chain profit also. He et al. (2009) look at a supply chain facing stochastic

demand which is sensitive to both sales effort and retail price. They show that when

demand is sensitive to both these quantities neither a returns policy nor a wholesale

price contract coordinates the supply chain. They show that a returns policy coupled
with sales rebate and penalty leads to a coordinating outcome for the supply chain.
The penalty comes into effect, anytime the retailer sells below the target level T,

which the supplier sets for the retailer. For every unit the retailer sells above the
target level, the retailer gets a rebate r.


Quantity discount contract: A general quantity discount contract can be defined as
one where there is a transfer payment T = w (q)*q, where w (q) is the wholesale

price per-unit, a decreasing function of q. Cachon (2003), in their review of supply
chain coordination using contracts opine interestingly that roughly speaking,

quantity discount contracts achieve coordination by manipulating the retailer's

marginal cost curve, while leaving the retailer's marginal revenue curve untouched.
This would be a simplistic but elegant way to understand the basic working of a
quantity discount contract. Ghandfourish and Loo (1992) propose a non-linear

quantity discount based procurement model for a multi-national oil company with
affiliated plants all over the world. They use a non-linear programming model to
reduce overall procurement cost, using this model. It would be apt to note here

though, that in this model, the oil company exercises significant control over the

affiliated plants' operational parameters and hence the situation considered in this
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problem is one that concerns a single decision maker rather than a decentralized
supply chain that forms the backdrop of most of the efforts in supply chain
coordination using contracts. Chen, Federgruen and Cheng (2001) study

mechanisms for coordinating a two-echelon distribution system consisting of one

supplier supplying to multiple downstream retailers, where the sales volumes are
derived endogenously using known demand functions. They show that this

decentralized system achieves equivalent performance (in terms of maximized
system-wide profits), as a centrally controlled system, when coordination is

achieved via periodically charged fixed fees and a discount pricing scheme where

the discount given is the sum of 3 components based on annual sales volume, order
quantity and order frequency respectively. They also show that a discounting

scheme based solely on order quantity is not sufficient to optimize channel-wide

profits in the presence of multiple identical downstream retailers. Su and Shi (2002)
present a game-theoretic framework for the quantity discount problem with return
contracts. They postulate a two-stage game model, where, in the first stage, the
manufacturer and retailer determine their inventory levels cooperatively

(manufacturing is make-to-order, end-user demand is stochastic) and in the second
stage, in an attempt to increase channel efficiency, the manufacturer designs an

optimal incentive scheme (quantity discount) to entice the retailer(buyer) to change
the ordering decision. The retailer can return unsold inventory to the manufacturer
at the end of the selling season for a pre-determined buyback price. The authors

develop a menu of optimal discount-return configurations that balance an optimal
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returns policy with a quantity discount and find among other things that a higher
wholesale price can result in a more liberal returns policy.

In summary, in this chapter, we have focused on reviewing the extant literature

related the problems presented and solved in this dissertation. We started with a review of
inventory decision-making models under a single decision maker, moving on to gametheoretic inventory models and the notion of inventories as a strategic weapon.

Subsequently we focused on the work that focuses on inventories as a strategic weapon in a
supply chain setting (with vertical control). Then we moved on to provide an overview of

basic game theory concepts used in this dissertation as well as the techniques used to deal

with multiple Nash equilibria. Finally, we conclude this review with a compilation of recent
research on supply chain coordination with contracts.
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3. DYNAMIC COURNOT DUOPOLY MODEL WITH VERTICAL CONTROL AND SI CARRIAGE BETWEEN PERIODS
This chapter presents two analytical models to determine the equilibrium SI levels and

associated profits for the manufacturer and retailers in a supply chain over two and three

periods, respectively. In both cases, we have one manufacturer and two retailers along with
vertical control, whereby the manufacturer exerts control over any of the decision

variables of the retailer, selling quantities and SI levels in this case, by setting the wholesale
prices at certain points of time. The manufacturer and retailers all compete for profit. The
two retailers are in a Cournot competition with each another, i.e., they compete on quantity. The demand is a known function of the product price.

The demand function in these models is a price-dependent linear function, a common

function form used in the supply chain, inventory, and economic modeling literature. That
is, the unit price of a product sold in the market is p (Q) = a-bQ. Here “a” is the reservation

price, the maximum a customer is willing to pay for this product. It is an exogenous strictly
positive model parameter. The parameter “b” is another strictly positive model parameter
with b<<a. Q is the total quantity on the market for sale in a particular selling season.

We approach the problem using a game-theoretic modeling and a backward induction

reasoning - observing the last period's decisions first and then working backward to the

previous periods' decisions. The equilibria obtained at every decision stage are sub-game

perfect Nash equilibria, i.e., the Nash equilibrium obtained at each decision stage is not only
the Nash equilibrium for that particular stage, but also a Nash equilibrium for the entire
game (Selten, 1975).
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3.1 Two-period Cournot duopoly model with vertical control and
SI carriage between periods
The first model we will present in this dissertation consists of one manufacturer

supplying a product to two Cournot duopoly retailers at its downstream in two consec-

utive selling seasons. The retailers are allowed to carry inventory between periods. The
two retailers are identical in all respects. All products are sold at the end of the 2 nd period. Figure 3.1 illustrates the model.

Figure 0.1 Illustration of a two-period Cournot duopoly model with Strategic Inventory
The business flow in the two periods is as follows:
Period 1:

Step 1: The manufacturer announces its 1st period wholesale price (w 1).

Step 2: Retailer 1 and Retailer 2 simultaneously announce their 1st period order

quantities, which is the sum of the quantity they want to sell in Period 1 (q 11 and
q12, respectively), and the quantity they want to carry to Period 2, I, for each of
the retailer. Inventories carried to the 2nd period are held at a holding cost of
h/unit.
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Step 3: The market decides the retail price, p, of each unit of product sold: p (q11+q12) =
a-b (q11+q12).

Step 4: Quantities q11 and q12 are sold simultaneously by Retailer 1 and Retailer 2 at the
price p (q11+q12) per unit and revenues are realized. Inventory I is carried by
each retailer over to the second period.

Period 2:

Step 1: The manufacturer announces the 2nd period wholesale price (w 2).

Step 2: Retailer 1 and Retailer 2 simultaneously announce their 2nd period order
quantities (q21 and q22).

Step 3: The market decides the retail price of each unit of product sold: p (q21+q22+2I) =
a-b(q21+q22+2I).

Step 4: Quantities (q21 + I) and (q22 + I) are sold simultaneously by Retailer 1 and
Retailer 2 at the retail price and revenues are realized.

The complete work for all the calculations of the equilibrium values is shown in the

Appendix. As an illustration, we briefly present below the procedure of determining the
retailers’ 2nd equilibrium period order quantity.
Nomenclature (all variables are non-negative):

i: period ; j: retailer; a: model parameter reservation price (a>0) ; b: model parameter

(b>0); qij = order quantity of retailer j in period i (i = 1,2; j = 1,2); Ij : inventory carried by

retailer j from period 1 to period 2; wi : wholesale price set by the manufacturer in period i
(i=1,2); h: holding cost of each retailer to carry one unit of inventory from period 1 to
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period 2 (it is assumed that both retailers have the same holding cost rate); ПRij : profit of
retailer j in period I; ПMi : profit of manufacturer in period i.

Since the two retailers are identical in all respects and have equal holding costs, we

can say that, in equilibrium, they carry equal amounts of inventory from the 1 st period to
the second. i.e., I1=I2 = I

Retailer 1's second period order quantity decisions
The conditions below are met by the decisions of the earlier periods’ business flow i.e.
Given:
0< w2< a (1); I1, I2≥0, h>0 (2); a-b (I1+I2) ≥ 0 (3)

The only decision variable here is q21, and the decision variable needs to meet the following
conditions:

a -b (q21+q22+2I) ≥ 0 (2nd period retail price is non-negative)
q21 ≥ 0

(4)

(2nd period retailer 1 sales quantity is non-negative)

(5)

Profit for the retailer is revenue minus cost, and we can write the 2 nd period profit function
for retailer 2 as:
ПR21 =( − (

+

+ 2 ))(

+ )−(

)

(6)

Taking the first derivative of (6) with respect to q21, we get:
= − (2
+
+3 )−

(7)

Differentiating (7) again with respect to q21, we have:
= −2 < 0

(8)

Equation (8) shows that (6) is concave with respect to q21. Setting (7) at zero, we get the
profit-maximizing 2nd period order quantity for retailer 1:
We need to check if (9) meets (4) and (5).
40

=

−

(9)

Re-arranging (4), we have: q21≤ − (

+2 )

(10)

Equation (9) can be re-written as:
=(

−

− )−( +

)≤

− (

+2 )≤ −(

+2 )

(11)

Equation (11) shows that (9) always meets (10).

Next, we check if (9) fulfills (5), which leads to the following sub-cases for the optimal q*21
decision:

Case 1.1(a): qo21 (9) ≤0, In this case we set q*21 = 0
Case 1.1(b): qo21 (9) > 0, In this case q*21 = qo21

(12)

(13)

Retailer 2's 2nd period order quantity decisions

Retailer 2’s 2nd period decisions are made using an identical procedure to Retailer 1, and

we can obtain the profit-maximizing 2nd period retailer order quantity decision (q o22) as:
=

−

(14)

and the following two cases (following an identical procedure to the previous section).
Case 1.2 (a): If qo22(14) ≤0, q*22 = 0
Case 1.2 (b): If qo22(14) > 0, q*22 = qo22 (14) =

−

(15)
(16)

Combined equilibrium analysis – q21 and q22 decisions

Since the two retailers are identical in all respects, symmetrical, in Cournot competition
with each other and, take their decisions simultaneously, we can postulate that their

equilibrium 2nd period order quantities are equal. There are only two possible equilibria:
Case (a): qo21 ≤ 0 and qo22 ≤ 0
In this case, q*21 = q*22 = 0 (from (12) and (14))
Case (b): qo21>0 and qo22>0 (Case 1.1(b) and Case 1.2(b))
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(17)

In this case, q*21 =
q*22 =

−

−

from (13))

(18)

(from (16))

(19)

Solving (18) and (19) together, we obtain,
q*21 = q*22 =
−

(20)

Equation (20) is the equilibrium order quantity decision for Retailer 1 and Retailer 2, in the
two period Cournot duopoly model with SI allowed between the two selling seasons.

3.1.1 Effect of downstream retailer competition over two periods
In this section we analyze the effect of retailer competition on equilibrium values.

Figure 3.2 below presents an illustration of this comparison:

vs.
Figure 0.2 Illustration of the comparison between a 2-period Cournot duopoly downstream
and a monopoly downstream model.
Table 3.1 presents a comparison of the equilibrium values of our model (two

competing retailers) with those of Anand et al. (2008) (one retailer). In the table, all values
for the downstream monopoly case are referenced from Anand et al. (2008). For ease of

comparison we express our results in Table 1 using the same nomenclature as theirs Q 1 =

(total purchase quantity in the 1st period) = q11 + q12 + 2I, p1 = (retail price-per-unit in the

1st period) = a-bq1, q1 = (total sale quantity) = q11+q12, Q2 = (total purchase quantity in the
2nd period) = q21 + q22, q2 = (total sale quantity in the 2nd period) = q21+q22+2I, p2=a - bq2
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(customer retail price in the 2nd period) and (the SI quantity) I* = 2I, since both retailers

carry identical SI of I into the 2nd period. We use this convention for all comparison tables in
this dissertation.
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Table 0.1 Comparison of equilibrium values between a two period Cournot duopoly and a
monopoly downstream models depending on the holding cost range (the results in column 2 are
the opposite for the other side of the holding cost ranges in column 3)
Quantities
Holding cost
Cournot duopoly downMonopoly
Result
compared
range
stream value
downstream value
w*1

Π

Always

w*2

higher

h< 0.906a

+ Π

lower

Always

Q*1

lower

h<=0.66a

lower

Always

q*1

Q*2
q*2

higher
lower

Always

p*1
p*2

lower

higher

Always

+ Π

lower

Always

12 − 3ℎ
23
19 + 24ℎ
46
− 198 ℎ + 42ℎ
529
10 − 14ℎ
23
22 + 6ℎ
69
0

8( − 6ℎ)
69
8( − 6ℎ)
69
10 − 14ℎ
23
(47 − 6ℎ)
23
61 + 48ℎ
69
594ℎ − 1164 ℎ + 442
4761

Always

lower

lower

120

Always

I*

Q*1+Q*2

Π

lower

Always
Always

9 − 2ℎ
17
6 + 10ℎ
17
9a − 4ah + 8h
34b
13 − 18ℎ
34
4 +ℎ
17
3 + 5ℎ
17
11 − 10ℎ
34
5( − 4ℎ)
34
19 − 8ℎ
34
13 − ℎ
17
23 + 10ℎ
34
155 − 118 ℎ + 304ℎ
1156

From Table 3.1, we see that the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits are always

lower across the two selling seasons combined in the Cournot duopoly downstream than in

the monopoly downstream. We can attribute this to increased double marginalization effect
due to the retailers needing to compete with one another and maximize their individual
profits. We observe that the introduction of the Cournot competition leads the

manufacturer setting a lower wholesale price in the first period and mostly higher (when

h<0.91a; which mostly holds) wholesale price in the 2nd period, in equilibrium, compares to
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when he supplies a similar monopoly downstream. The equilibrium SI quantity set by the
retailers, in response, is lower.

We compare the wholesale and retail prices over the two periods combined. In each

case, the average is a weighted average, weighted by the quantity bought in each period for
the wholesale price and the quantity sold in the period for the retail price.
wavg.Cournot =

(21); wavg. monopoly =

(22).

Subtracting these two quantities; (21)-(22) yields:

(23).

Since a>>h usually, we ignore the h terms of (23) to obtain:

> 0 always. Hence we can

conclude that the Cournot duopoly downstream leads to mostly higher average wholesale
prices. We compute weighted average retail prices similarly, to obtain:
pavgCournot =

(

(

)

)

(24); pavgmonopoly =

(25).

Subtracting these two quantities, we get (24)-(25) =
(26). Ignoring h terms from equation (26), we get

>0 always. Thus, we conclude

that a Cournot duopoly downstream leads to mostly higher equilibrium wholesale and

retail prices. However, neither of these, higher wholeasale prices set by the manufacturer

on average across the two periods, or the higher retail prices commanded by either retailer
over the two periods, leads to either the manufacturers or retailers making a higher profit

in the presence of downstream retailer competition, compared to a monopoly downstream.
This is because, the order quantity for both periods combined (Q 1+Q2 from Table 1) is
lower and this offsets the higher wholesale and retail prices commanded by the
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manufacturer and the retailers respectively, to drag down both their profits compared to
the monopoly case, in aggregate.

Next, we check the impact of Cournot competition on Consumer Surplus over two

selling seasons. Consumer Surplus is the difference between the total amount the

consumers are willing to pay for the good and the price they actually pay. Since the

maximum possible price of the good is the reserve price “a”, the total Consumer Surplus
over the two periods is given by CS = ( −

)

+

( −

)

. Computing Consumer

Surplus for the two cases compared – Cournot duopoly and Monopoly downstream we
have:

CSCournotDuopoly =

(28) and CSMonopoly =

(29).

Subtracting these two quantities: (28) – (29) yields:

< 0 when

a>>h, which mostly holds. Thus, we can conclude that the introduction of downstream
Cournot competition mostly reduces Consumer Surplus.

In summary, over two selling seasons, both the Manufacturer and downstream

Cournot competing retailers make lower profit compared to when the downstream is a

single retailer monopoly. This is due to the presence of downstream retailer competition –

double marginalization effect. Consumers do not benefit either, as evidenced by the lower

Consumer Surplus in the Cournot duopoly case. Strategic Inventory is carried at a finite but
lower level than the monopoly downstream, by the Cournot duopoly retailers and this
doesn’t help the retailers make a higher profit in aggregate, than the monopoly
downstream.

46

3.1.2: Effect of Strategic Inventory over two periods
In Table 3.2 we present a comparison of the equilibrium values of our model with a

static Cournot duopoly model, i.e., a model that does not allow a Strategic Inventory. This
comparison shows the effect of SI in the presence of a Cournot competing retailer
downstream. Fig 3.3 is an illustration of this comparison.

Vs.

Figure 0.3 Illustration of the comparison between a two-period Cournot duopoly model with
SI and a Static Cournot duopoly model
Table 0.2 Comparison of equilibrium values between a two period Cournot duopoly with SI
and a static Cournot duopoly (no SI) depending on the holding cost range (for the other side of
the holding cost range in column 3, the result in column 2 is the opposite)
Quantities compared

Result

Holding cost
range

w*1

Lower

always

w*2

Lower

h≤a/6

+ Π

Lower

always

Q*1

Higher

h≤a/6

q*1

Higher

h≤a/6

Q*2

Lower

always

q*2

Lower

always

I*

Higher

always

Q*1+Q*2

Lower

always

Π

Cournot duopoly downstream
value

120

12 − 3ℎ
23
19 + 24ℎ
46
− 198 ℎ + 42ℎ
529
10 − 14ℎ
23
22 + 6ℎ
69
0

8( − 6ℎ)
69
8( − 6ℎ)
69
10 − 14ℎ
23
47

Static Cournot
duopoly value
a

2
a
2

a2

3b
a
3b
a
3b
a
3b
a
3b

N/A

19a − 8h
34b

Π

p*1

Lower

always

p*2

Higher

always

+ Π

Lower

always

(47 − 6ℎ)
23
61 + 48ℎ
69
594ℎ − 1164 ℎ + 442
4761

2a
3

2a
3

a2

18b

From Table 3.2 we see that the manufacturer and retailer profits are always lower

across the two selling seasons combined when SI is allowed. We observe that the

manufacturer mostly sets a lower wholesale price in the first period, and a mostly lower

wholesale price in the second period, as well, (when h<=a/6; which mostly holds) when SI
is allowed. SI is carried in equilibrium when it is allowed, compared to a static Cournot

duopoly downstream where each period is modeled as a one-shot game with no inventory
allowed to be carried between periods. We compare the wholesale and retail prices over

the two periods combined. In each case, the average is a weighted average, weighted by the
quantity bought in each period for the wholesale price and the quantity sold in the period
for the retail price.
wavg.CournotSI =
(30)- (31) yields:

(30); wavgstaticCournot =

(31).

(32). Ignoring the h terms from (32), since a>>h, we get:

>0 always.

We can hence conclude that the manufacturer mostly sets a higher wholesale price on

average, over the two selling season, when SI is allowed. We similarly compute weighted
average retail prices, to obtain: pavgCournotSI =

(

(

)

)

(33); pavgstaticCournot =

(34). Subtracting the two terms we computed above, (33)-(34) yields:
Ignoring h terms again. we get

.

<0 always since a > 0. We can hence conclude that
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allowing SI leads to lower retail prices on average. Next, we ascertain the impact of

introduction of SI in a Cournot duopoly downstream on Consumer Surplus. Computing
Consumer Surplus for the two cases compared we have:
CSCournotSI =

(35) and CSStaticCournot =

(36). (35)- (36) yields:

(37). Ignoring h terms in (37) we get:

which is <0 always. This

implies that Consumer Surplus is mostly lower when SI is allowed over two selling seasons.
In summary, we see that allowing SI under Cournot duopoly downstream over two

selling seasons does not help any of the SC entities in any way with reduced manufacturer

profit, reduced retailer profit, and reduced Consumer Surplus. Though the retailers carry
SI in equilibrium, and enough of it to not order at all in the 2nd period and sell only the
carried SI, this strategy is insufficient for them to make a better profit than the static
Cournot case.

3.2 Three-period Cournot duopoly model with vertical control
and SI carriage between periods

In this section, we present a comparison of a three period Cournot duopoly model and a

three period model with one manufacturer selling to one retailer with SI carriage allowed
between periods, using the framework established by Anand et al. (2008). Anand et al.

(2008) do not provide closed form expressions for the equilibrium decision variable values
for a three-period model; we derive them here for ease of comparison, using the same
framework and assumptions established in their study.

3.2.1 Effect of Cournot competition over three selling seasons
In Table 3.3 we present a comparison of equilibrium manufacturer wholesale prices
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between the 3-period Cournot duopoly model and a 3-period model with one manufacturer
supplying to a single retailer monopoly downstream. This yields the effect of Cournot

duopoly competition over three periods. Fig 3.4 below is an illustration of this comparison.

Vs.
Figure 0.4 Illustration of the comparison between a three-period Cournot duopoly model with
SI and a 3-period monopoly downstream model with SI

50

Table 0.3 Comparison of equilibrium values between three period Cournot duopoly with SI and
monopoly downstream model with SI, depending on the holding cost range (the result in column
2 is the opposite for the other side of the holding cost range in column 3)
Quantities compared

Result

Holding cost
range

Three-period Cournot duopoly value

Monopoly
downstream value

w*2

lower

always

a

lower

always

12a − 3h
23

lower

always

Q*1

higher

always

q*1

lower

always

Q*2

lower

always

q*2

lower

always

w*1

w*3
Π

+ Π

+ Π

Q*3

Π

higher

same

always

lower

always

I*1

higher

always

I*2

lower

always

p*1

higher

always

p*2

lower

always

p*3

higher

always

lower

always

+Π

24ℎ + 19
46

792ℎ − 126 ℎ + 1586
4761
2
2ℎ
+
9b 3b

0

44 − 264ℎ
207
6ℎ + 22
69

always

q*3

+ Π

a

0

8 − 48ℎ
69
2
2ℎ
+
9b 3b

8 − 48ℎ
69

-
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47 − 6ℎ
69
61 + 48ℎ
69

-

20

a

−4 ℎ+ℎ
16
2 −ℎ
4
4b

+

ℎ
8b

2 − 3ℎ
8
0

2 − 3ℎ
8
6 −ℎ
8
6 + 3ℎ
8
0

19ℎ − 36 ℎ − 20
64

From Table 3.3 we see that the manufacturer profits and retailer profits are lower in

a Cournot duopoly downstream with SI allowed, compared to a monopoly downstream,
over three selling seasons. This is similar to the result obtained in Section 3.1 over two

selling seasons, further bolstering the evidence that double marginalization erodes profits
in the presence of downstream Cournot competition, irrespective of the number of selling
seasons.

We observe that the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price in the first period

and lower in the two subsequent ones in a Cournot duopoly downstream compared to a

monopoly downstream. SI is carried at a higher level, from the 1 st to the 2nd period and is
carried at a lower level from the 2nd to the 3rd period.

We compare the average wholesale and retail prices over the three periods
combined. wavg. 3PDCournotSI = (39)- (40) yields:

(39); wavg3PDMonopolySI =

(

)

(

)

(40).

(41). Ignoring the h terms from (41)

since a>>h, we see that (41) <0 always.
Hence we conclude that the manufacturer mostly sets a lower wholesale price on

average, over the three selling seasons, when supplying to a Cournot duopoly downstream
versus a monopoly over three selling seasons.

We compute average retail prices similarly to obtain:
pavg3PdCournotSI =

(43); pavgstaticCournot =

Subtracting the two equations above: (43)-(44) yields:

−(2115ℎ − 9765 ℎ − 3712 ℎ − 244
11592ℎ − 31464 ℎ + 16560
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(44).

)

(45). we observe that (45) > 0, when a>>h, which mostly holds. Thus we can say that retail

prices are mostly higher in a Cournot duopoly downstream with SI allowed compared to a
monopoly downstream over three selling seasons.

Next, we ascertain the impact of Cournot competition on Consumer Surplus over three
selling seasons. Computing Consumer Surplus for the two cases compared we have:
CS3PDCournotSI =

(

)

(46) and CSMonopoly =

(47).

Subtracting the two equations above, (46)-(47) yields:
(

(

(48)

We see readily that (48) is < 0 when a>>h, which mostly holds. This implies that, Consumer
Surplus is mostly lower in a Cournot duopoly downstream with SI allowed over three
selling seasons.

In summary, we see that the effect of competition over three selling seasons with SI

carriage allowed between periods, mirrors the results for the two-period case. Like we saw,
over two selling seasons in Section 3.1, manufacturer and retailer profits are both

uniformly lower in the presence of a Cournot competing retailer downstream versus a

monopoly downstream, over three selling seasons. Consumer Surplus is also lower, as in
the two-selling season model. The retail prices are higher compared to the monopoly

downstream supply chain, but like in the two-period case, the higher retail prices, fail to
translate into higher profits for the retailer in aggregate. Average wholesale prices are

lower in the 3-selling season model with a Cournot duopoly downstream, than the two-

selling season model, where they are higher than the corresponding monopoly downstream
model with two selling seasons as well. This seems to indicate that, as the number of selling
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seasons increases, this has a depressive effect on the average wholesale price, with all other
things being equal.

3.2.2 Effect of Strategic Inventory in a Cournot Competing duopoly
downstream supply chain over three selling seasons.
In Table 3.4, we present a comparison of a three-period model with SI allowed to a

three-period static model (one-selling season model with no SI allowed, replicated thrice).
This comparison allows us to get an insight into which of the effects of SI allowance in a

Cournot duopoly downstream are sustained when the number of selling seasons goes from
two to three. Figure 3.5 below illustrates this comparison.

Vs.
Figure 0.5 Illustration of the comparison between a three period Cournot duopoly model with
SI and a Static Cournot duopoly model over three periods
Table 0.4 Comparison of equilibrium values between three period Cournot duopoly with SI and
static Cournot duopoly (no SI) depending on the holding cost range (the result in column 2 is
the opposite for the other side of the holding cost range in column 3)
Quantities compared

Result

w*1

higher

w*2
w*3
Π + Π
+ Π
Q*1

Holding cost
range

3-period Cournot duopoly
value

Static Cournot
value

lower

always

0.5a

Lower

always

12a − 3h
23

lower

always

lower

always

always

a

24ℎ + 19
46

792ℎ2 − 126 ℎ + 1586
4761

2
2ℎ
+
9b 3b
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0.5a

0.5a
2

a2

3b

0.334a
b

Π

q*1

lower

always

Q*2

lower

always

q*2

Lower

h≤a/6

Q*3

lower

always

q*3

lower

Always

I*1

higher

always

I*2

higher

always

p*1

higher

Always

p*2

lower

h≤a/6

p*3

higher

Always

lower

Always

+ Π

+Π

0.334a

0
44 − 264ℎ
207

3b

69

3b
a

6ℎ + 22
0

8 − 48ℎ
69
2
2ℎ
+
9b 3b
8 − 48ℎ
69
47 − 6ℎ
69

61 + 48ℎ

-

b
a

69

8154ℎ2 +16476 ℎ+1898 2
14283

a

3b
a
3b
0
0
0.67a
0.67a
0.67a
a2

12b

From Table 3.4 we see that both manufacturer and retailer profits are always lower

in equilibrium when the manufacturer supplies to a Cournot duopoly downstream with SI

allowed, over three selling seasons compared to a similar downstream where SI is allowed
Static Cournot duopoly model).

We observe that the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price in the first period

than the static solution and lower in the two subsequent ones with a Cournot duopoly
downstream. SI is the higher than the static solution (zero) from 1st to 2nd period and

higher again than the static solution from the 2nd to 3rd period. We compare the wholesale
and retail prices over the three periods combined using the average wholesale and retail
price in both cases.
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wavg. 3PDCournotSI = -

(49); wavg3PDStatticCournot = (50).

Subtracting these two equations above, (49)-(50) yields:

(

)

(51). We see

that (51) is > 0 when a>>h, which holds in most real-world supply chains. Thus, we

conclude that the manufacturer mostly sets a higher wholesale prices on average when SI
carriage is allowed in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer supplying product to a

Cournot duopoly downstream of retailers over three seasons, compared to when it is not
allowed.

We compute weighted average retail prices similarly, to obtain:
pavg3PdCournotSI =

(52); pavgstaticCournot = (53).

Subtracting the two equations above, (52)-(53) yields:

(54). We observe

that (55) > 0 (when a>>h). We can hence conclude that retail prices are mostly higher in a
Cournot duopoly downstream with SI allowed compared to a static Cournot duopoly
downstream (no SI) over three selling seasons. Next, we ascertain the impact on SI

allowance in a Cournot duopoly downstream on Consumer Surplus over three selling

seasons. Computing Consumer Surplus for the two cases compared we have: CS3PDCournotSI =
(

)

(56) and CSMonopoly =

.

(57).

Subtracting the two equations above, (56)-(57) yields:
(

(

)

(58).

We see readily that (59) is <0 always when a>>h, which mostly holds. This implies that,
Consumer Surplus is mostly lower in a Cournot duopoly downstream with SI allowed,
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versus a similar Cournot duopoly with no SI, over three selling seasons.
In summary, over three selling seasons, the effect of allowing SI carriage in a supply

chain consisting of a manufacturer supplying to a Cournot duopoly downstream of retailers,
mirrors the effects observed when the number of selling seasons is two, in Section 3.2. Both
manufacturer and retailer profits are lower, over three selling seasons when SI is allowed

than the static one-shot game in each period where no SI carried, as in the two-period case.
SI is carried in equilibrium, when it is allowed, in the 3 selling season model, both from
period 1-2 and from period 2-3. However, this does not seem to be enough to confer a

strategic advantage to the competing downstream retailers, as their profits are consistently
lower than the static solution. Consumers also do not seem to be benefited (lower

Consumer Surplus) by allowing SI carriage by downstream retailers. Again, this mirrors
what is observed in the two-period case, where the consumers are worse-off with SI

allowed. Average retail prices in the 3-period model are higher than the static solution,

whereas over two-selling seasons, they are lower, implying that the retailers are able to
command a higher retail price in the market, on an average, as the number of selling

seasons increases from two to three. It is remarkable however, that, this does not translate
into higher retailer profits.

3.3 Conclusions

In this chapter, we presented a two-period and three-period model of a supply chain, a

manufacturer supplying to a downstream Cournot duopoly of retailers with SI carrying

allowed between periods. This problem is formulated as a dynamic game and closed-form
equilibrium decisions variable values for both the manufacturer and retailers in every
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period, are derived.
We find that, the introduction of downstream Cournot duopoly competition of a supply

chain consisting of one manufacturer supplying identical product to the retailers leads to
lower profits for both the manufacturer and retailer. This holds, whether the number of
selling season is two or three. Consumer Surplus is also uniformly lower under

downstream retailer competition, compared to a downstream monopoly supply chain. This

implies that the introduction of downstream retailer competition leaves all the SC entities –
manufacturer, retailer and consumer, worse off, due to the double marginalization effect.

When we try to deduce the effect of SI carriage under Cournot duopoly competition by

comparing an SC with Cournot duopoly competition and SI allowed between periods to a
similar SC with a Cournot duopoly downstream and a static, repeating one-shot game in

each period with no SI carried, we find again that manufacturer and retailer profits are both
lower when SI carriage is allowed. This holds whether the number of selling seasons is two

or three. Consumer Surplus is also lower uniformly over both two and three selling seasons.
This indicates that allowing SI carriage, in the presence of downstream retailer competition
does not benefit either the manufacturer or retailer in contrast to what is observed in the
monopoly downstream case, where the retailer clearly benefits.

Further investigation is necessary to determine if and how much the effects observed in

this research with the interaction of Strategic Inventories and competition are an artifact of
the type of downstream retailer competition chosen to be modeled – Cournot. It would be
meaningful to examine this system’s behavior under other models of competition like

Bertrand and Stackelberg (one of the retailers is the leader) to deduce the effect of the
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mode of competition on SI and other key performance indicators for the manufacturer and

downstream retailers. Another logical extension of the study would be to try to generalize
the results for two and three selling seasons to arbitrary selling season lengths and see if

and how well the insights derived for two and three selling seasons hold for the “n” period
case. It would also be valuable to validate empirically some of the observations from this

paper, and others in this line of research, to see if the insights predicted by game-theoretic
modeling hold up in the real-world; if yes, how strongly and if not, where the key points of
divergence are and how that can inform further theoretical model-building in this area.

59

4. COURNOT DUOPOLY MODEL UNDER A
COMMITMENT CONTRACT
In this chapter, we aim to analyze the impact of a “Commitment contract” on Strategic

Inventory in a one-manufacturer two-retailer supply chain, with the two retailers competing as a Cournot duopoly. When the manufacturer agrees to use a “Commitment contract”
he/she is agreeing to set the wholesale prices for both the 1 st and 2nd period at the beginning of the 1st period itself. Anand et. al. (2008) use this type of contract in a supply chain
without downstream retailer competition (one manufacturer supplying to a monopoly

downstream retailer) and find that a Commitment contract eliminates Strategic Inventory
carriage. In other words, the Commitment contract ends up being a “strategic tool” for the

manufacturer to successfully dissuade the downstream retailer from carrying Strategic Inventory. One of our objectives here is to see if the same holds when the downstream is a
Cournot-competing retailer duopoly.

4.1 Two-period Cournot duopoly Model with Commitment contract:
The model considered here consists of one manufacturer supplying a product in two

consecutive selling seasons to two Cournot duopoly retailers at its downstream. The retail-

ers are allowed to carry inventory between periods. The two retailers are identical in all respects. All product is sold at the end of the 2nd period. Figure 4.1 illustrates this model.
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M1

w1, w2
Q12

Q11

M1
I
Q21
R1

R2

R1

q11

q21

q12

Q22
R2

q22

Figure 0.1 Illustration of two-period Cournot duopoly model under Commitment contract
The business flow in the two periods is as follows:
Period 1:

Step 1: The manufacturer announces its 1st period wholesale price (w1) and 2nd period
wholesale price at the beginning of period 1

Step 2: Retailer 1 and Retailer 2 simultaneously announce their 1 st period order

quantities, which is the sum of the quantity they want to sell in Period 1 (q 11 and
q12, respectively), and the quantity they want to carry to Period 2, I for each of
the retailer. Inventories carried to the 2nd period are held at a holding cost of
h/unit.

Step 3: The market decides the retail price, p, of each unit of product sold: p (q11+q12) =
a-b (q11+q12).

Step 4: Quantities q11 and q12 are sold simultaneously by Retailer 1 and Retailer 2 at the
price p (q11+q12) per unit and revenues are realized. Inventory I is carried by
each retailer over to the second period.
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Period 2:

Step 1: Retailer 1 and Retailer 2 simultaneously announce their 2 nd period order
quantities (q21 and q22).

Step 2: The market decides the retail price of each unit of product sold: p (q21+q22+2I) =
a-b (q21+q22+2I).

Step3: Quantities (q21 + I) and (q22 + I) are sold simultaneously by Retailer 1 and
Retailer 2 at the price p (q21+q22 + 2I) per unit and revenues are realized.

We now determine the profit-maximizing selling quantity in both periods and the

wholesale prices of the manufacturer in both periods. We start with the 2 nd period retailer
decisions.

Nomenclature (all variables are non-negative): i: period (i=1,2,3) , j: retailer (i=1,2),

a: model parameter reservation price (a>0) , b: model parameter (b>0, a>>b), qij: buying

quantity of retailer j in period i, to be sold in the same period (i.e., excluding SI) I: inventory
carried by each retailer from Period 1 to Period 2, wi: wholesale price set by the

manufacturer in period i, h: holding cost of each retailer to carry one unit of inventory from
Period 1 to Period 2, ПRij: profit of retailer j in period I, ПMi: profit of the manufacturer in
period i.. Determination of the equilibrium quantities start from the retailer’s decision in
the second period. The complete work for the determination is shown in the Appendix.
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4.1.1 Effect of a Cournot duopoly competition on a Commitment

contract over two periods

Anand et al. (2008) find that a Commitment contract completely eliminates SI in a

two-period model with one manufacturer supplying to a single downstream retailer. Under

a Commitment contract, the manufacturer announces the wholesale price for the 1 st and 2nd
period at the beginning of the 1st period. In this section, we study the effect of this contract
on SI in the case with downstream retailer competition. The equilibrium decision variable
values for the manufacturer and retailers under a Commitment contract are as follows:
w*1 = w*2 = , q*11 = q*12 =

= , q*21 = q*22 = 0, I* =

=

In Table 4.1, we present a comparison of the equilibrium decision variable values of

the Cournot duopoly downstream model under a Commitment contract with those of the

one-manufacturer, one-retailer model under a Commitment contract. Figure 4.2 below illustrates this comparison.

Vs.

Figure 0.2 Illustration of the comparison between a two-period Cournot duopoly with SI
under Commitment contract and a two-period monopoly downstream with SI under
Commitment contract
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Table 0.1 Comparison of equilibrium values between a two period Cournot duopoly with
Commitment contract and monopoly downstream model with Commitment contract depending
on the holding cost range (the results in column 2 are the opposite for the other side of the
holding cost ranges in column 3)
Quantities
compared

Result

Holding
cost
range

Cournot duopoly
downstream under a
Commitment contract

Monopoly downstream
under a Commitment
contract

w*1

same

always

w*2

same

always

2

2

+ Π

higher

always

2

2

Q*1

higher

always

3
2
3

4

Π

q*1

Q*2
q*2
I*

lower

higher

higher

always

p*2

lower

Always

+ Π

lower

3
2
3
2
3
2
3

always

always

4

3

always

always

4

0

always

higher
lower

3

always

Q*1+Q*2
p*1

Π

higher

4

18

−

4
0

ℎ
6

2
3
4
3
4
8

From Table 4.1, we see that the manufacturer’s profit is always higher and retailer’

profits always lower across the two selling seasons when supplying to a Cournot duopoly
downstream than in a monopoly downstream, under a Commitment contract. The

introduction of the Cournot competition does not change the manufacturer wholesale price
decision under a Commitment contract. The average retail price paid by the consumer is

lower in the Cournot duopoly case in both periods. Next, we check the impact of Cournot

competition on Consumer Surplus over two selling seasons under a Commitment contract.
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Consumer Surplus is the difference between the total amount the consumers are willing to
pay for the good and the price they actually pay. Since the maximum possible price of the

good is the reserve price “a”, the total Consumer Surplus over the two periods is given by CS
= ( −

)

+

( −

)

. Computing Consumer Surplus for the two cases compared

– Cournot duopoly and Monopoly downstream supply chains under a Commitment
contract, we have: CSCournotDuopoly =

(1) and CSMonopoly =

(2). From (1) and (2) above,

we see that (1) < (2) always, i.e., the consumer surplus in a Cournot duopoly downstream is
less under a Commitment contract, compared to a monopoly downstream under the same
contractual structure.

In summary, over the two selling seasons, the manufacturer ends up with an

advantage, making a higher profit under a Commitment contract with downstream retailer
competition, than compared to supplying to a monopoly downstream under the same
contract. The retailers, while competing as a Cournot duopoly, are not able to use the

relative advantage that comes from a Commitment contract –i.e., knowing the 2 period
nd

wholesale price before-hand to buy product and carry inventory strategically from the 1

st

period to the 2 to make a higher profit, as they are, when the downstream. The consumer
nd

also seems to be disadvantaged more with the introduction of downstream Cournot

competition under a Commitment contract. This can be attributed to increased doublemarginalization effect. Strategic Inventory is carried at a finite (and hence) higher level

under a Commitment contract when the downstream is a Cournot duopoly rather than a
monopoly.
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4.1.2 Commitment contract vs. dynamic contract in the presence of Cournot
duopoly Competition
In Table 4.2, we present a comparison of the equilibrium values of our model with dynamic
two-period model with a Cournot duopoly downstream (without a commitment contract).
This comparison shows the effect of a Commitment contract on SI with a Cournot
competing retailer downstream. Fig. 4.3 illustrates this comparison.

Vs.

Figure 0.3 Illustration of the comparison between a two-period Cournot duopoly model with SI
under a Commitment contract and a two-period Dynamic Cournot duopoly model with SI.
Table 0.2 Comparison of equilibrium values between a two period Cournot duopoly with
Commitment contract and a Dynamic two-period Cournot duopoly model depending on the
holding cost range (the results in column 2 are the opposite for the other side of the holding
cost ranges in column 3)
Quantities
compared

Result

w*1

lower

w*2

lower

always

+ Π

higher

always

Q*1

higher

always

Q*2

same

always

Π

q*1
q*2
I*

Q*1+Q*2

higher
higher
higher
higher

Holding cost
range

2-period Cournot duopoly model under a
Commitment contract

h≤

Dynamic 2-period
Cournot duopoly model

2
2
3b
2
3
2
3
0

always
always

3

always
always
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3
2
3

120

12 − 3ℎ
23
19 + 24ℎ
46
− 198 ℎ + 42ℎ
529
10 − 14ℎ
23
22 + 6ℎ
69
0
8( − 6ℎ)
69
8( − 6ℎ)
69
10 − 14ℎ
23

Π

p*1

lower

h≤95a/18

+ Π

lower

always

p*2

lower

2
3
2
3

always

−

18

(47 − 6ℎ)
23
61 + 48ℎ
69
594ℎ − 1164 ℎ + 442
4761

ℎ
6

From Table 4.2 we see that manufacturer makes a higher profit, and retailers, lower,

under a Commitment contract. We observe that the manufacturer mostly sets a lower

wholesale price in the first period (when h≤ ; which mostly holds) and lower wholesale
price in the second period, as well, when supplying under a Commitment contract versus
without to a Cournot duopoly of retailers with SI allowed. SI is carried at a higher level

under a Commitment contract, implying that the Commitment contract is not effective in

dissuading (or completely eliminating as in the monopoly downstream case (Anand et al.
2008)) strategic inventory carriage in the presence of downstream retailer competition.

We compare the wholesale price over the two periods combined. In each case, the

average is a weighted average, weighted by the quantity bought in each period i.e.:
wavg.CommitmentCournot =

(3); wavg.DynamicCournot =

(4)

Comparing (3) and (4), we can write (3) < (4) always and hence conclude that the average

equilibrium manufacturer wholesale prices are lower under a Commitment contract than a
Dynamic contract, when the downstream is a competing Cournot duopoly of retailers.
We similarly compute weighted average retail prices, to obtain:
pavg CommitmentCournot =

(5); pavgDynamicCournot = pavgCournot =

(

Subtracting the two terms we computed above, (5)-(6) yields:
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(

)

)

(6)
.

Ignoring h terms, we get

>0 always since a > 0. We can hence conclude that the

consumers pay a higher price on average, over the two selling seasons under a
Commitment contract in the presence of downstream Cournot competition.

Next, we ascertain the impact of introduction of SI in a Cournot duopoly downstream on
Consumer Surplus. Computing Consumer Surplus for the two cases compared we have:
CSCommitmentCourot =

(35) and CSDynamicCournot =
(37). Ignoring h terms in (38) we get:

(36). (35) - (36) yields:
which is >0 always. We hence

conclude that Consumer Surplus is higher under a Commitment contract compared to a
Dynamic two-period ordering model with SI allowed between periods, in a Cournot
duopoly downstream.

The manufacturer makes a higher profit and retailers lower under a Commitment

contract compared a Dynamic contract in the presence of downstream Cournot duopoly

competition. Consumers benefit under a Commitment contract vs. Dynamic contract since
consumer surplus is higher under a Commitment contract.
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4.2 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented a two-period model of a manufacturer supplying

identical product to a Cournot duopoly downstream of retailers under a “Commitment

contract” regime, where the manufacturer quotes the wholesale price for both periods, at
the beginning of the 1st period itself. We derive closed-form equilibrium values for all
decision variables using game-theoretic modeling.

We find, over the two selling seasons, the manufacturer ends up with an advantage,

making a higher profit under a Commitment contract with downstream retailer

competition, than compared to supplying to a monopoly downstream under the same
contract. The retailers, while competing as a Cournot duopoly, are not able to use the

relative advantage that comes from a Commitment contract – i.e.,, knowing the 2nd period

wholesale price before-hand, to buy product and carry inventory strategically from the 1 st

period to the 2nd to make a higher profit, as they are, when the downstream. The consumer
also seems to be disadvantaged more with the introduction of downstream Cournot

competition under a Commitment contract. This can be attributed to increased doublemarginalization effect. Strategic Inventory is carried at a finite (and hence) higher level

under a Commitment contract when the downstream is a Cournot duopoly rather than a

monopoly. When we compare a manufacturer supplying to a Cournot duopoly downstream
of retailers, with, and without a Commitment contract (dynamic ordering), we see that the

consumer benefits under a Commitment contract, and that, consumer surplus is higher. The
manufacturer makes a higher profit and retailers lower, under a Commitment contract over
two selling seasons in the presence of downstream retailer competition. In summary, over
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two selling seasons, the manufacturer benefits under a commitment contract and the
retailers are at a disadvantage.

Development of contracts that are more effective than a Commitment contract in

coordinating this supply chain – increasing consumer surplus and further increasing

manufacturer and retailer profits can be explored using the results presented in this work.

It would also be interesting to run empirical studies in real-world supply chains to validate
if and how much the insights developed by this kind of game-theoretic modeling hold in a
real-world supply chain setting.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In Chapter three, we presented a two-period and three-period model of one

manufacturer supplying identical product to a Cournot duopoly of retailers with SI carrying
allowed between periods. We formulated this problem as a dynamic game and derived

closed-form equilibrium decisions variable values for both the manufacturer and retailers
in every period. In Chapter four, we presented two and three period Cournot duopoly

downstream models with SI, under a “Commitment contract” where the manufacturer
commits to the wholesale price for every selling season, at the beginning of the first.

We find that, the introduction of Cournot duopoly competition in the downstream of a

supply chain consisting of one manufacturer supplying identical product to the retailers
leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and retailer. This holds, whether the

number of selling season is two or three. Consumer Surplus is also uniformly lower under

downstream retailer competition, compared to a downstream monopoly supply chain. This
implies that the introduction of competition leaves all the SC entities – manufacturer,
retailer and consumer, worse off, due to the double marginalization effect.

When we try to deduce the effect of SI carriage under Cournot duopoly competition, by

comparing an SC with Cournot duopoly competition and SI allowed between periods, to a
similar SC with a Cournot duopoly downstream and a static, repeating, one-shot game in

each period, with no SI carried – we find again that manufacturer and retailer profits are

both lower when SI carriage is allowed. This holds whether the number of selling seasons is
two or three. Consumer Surplus is also lower uniformly over both two and three selling

seasons. This indicates that allowing SI carriage, in the presence of downstream retailer
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competition does not benefit either the manufacturer or retailer in stark contrast to what is
observed in the monopoly downstream case, where the retailer clearly benefits.

Under a Commitment contract, over two selling seasons, as we see in Chapter 4, the

manufacturer ends up with an advantage, making a higher profit with downstream retailer
competition, than compared to supplying to a monopoly downstream under the same
contract. The retailers, while competing as a Cournot duopoly, are not able to use the

relative advantage that comes from a Commitment contract – i.e., knowing the 2nd period

wholesale price before-hand, to buy product and carry inventory strategically from the 1 st
period to the 2nd to make a higher profit, as they are, when the downstream is a single
retailer monopoly. The consumer also seems to be disadvantaged more with the

introduction of Cournot competition under a Commitment contract. This can be attributed
to increased double-marginalization effect. Strategic Inventory is carried at a finite (and
hence) higher level under a Commitment contract when the downstream is a Cournot
duopoly rather than a monopoly.

When we compare a manufacturer supplying to a Cournot duopoly downstream of

retailers, with, and without a Commitment contract (dynamic ordering), we see that the
manufacturer, retailers and consumer all benefit under a Commitment contract in the

presence of downstream Cournot competition. The manufacturer and retailer make higher
profits under a Commitment contract compared a Dynamic contract in the presence of

downstream Cournot duopoly competition. However, this profit for the retailers is less than
what they would make, if the downstream was a single retailer monopoly under the same
Commitment contract. So, we can say that, though the retailers still benefit under a

Commitment contract under downstream Cournot competition, the magnitude of benefit is
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diminished by the presence of competition. Consumers benefit under a Commitment

contract vs. Dynamic contract since consumer surplus is higher under a Commitment
contract.

We see from the previous sections that, under a commitment contract (compared to

dynamic ordering) in the presence of downstream Cournot competing retailers with SI

allowed, the manufacturer is benefitted, making a higher profit than dynamic ordering. This
is a counter-intuitive result since one would expect the manufacturer to make a lesser

profit in equilibrium under a commitment contract, since he/she locks him/her self up to

the 2nd period wholesale price decision at the beginning of the 1 st period itself, and does not
afford him/her self the opportunity to quote a 2nd period wholesale price, in response to

the manufacturer decisions in the 1st period like total quantity ordered, quantity sold in 1 st
period, quantity carried as Strategic Inventory etc. We however see such counter-intuitive

findings in closely related literature. For example, Anand et al. (2008) argue that the whole
idea of “Strategic Inventory” being carried in equilibrium, at a finite holding cost h/unit,

being a drain on channel profits, is counter-intuitive, and it is inexplicable why SI will be

carried, when the traditional reasons for inventory carriage are absent, and the retailer has
an opportunity to buy product again in the 2nd period. However, they then explain the

counter-intuitive result as a strategy by the retailer to hedge against the uncertainty in 2 nd
period wholesale price and further demonstrate it works, since once that uncertainty is
removed (through a commitment contract) such inventory carrying disappears in
equilibrium.
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Further investigation is necessary to determine if and how much the effects ob-

served in this research with the interaction of Strategic Inventories, contractual structures,

and competition are an artifact of the type of downstream retailer competition chosen to be
modeled – Cournot. It would be meaningful to examine this system’s behavior under other
models of competition like Bertrand and Stackelberg (one of the retailers is the leader) to
deduce the effect of the mode of competition on SI and other key performance indicators
for the manufacturer and downstream retailers. Another logical extension of this work

would be generalizing the results from two and three selling seasons to see if and how well
the insights derived for two and three selling seasons hold for the “n” period case. Running
empirical studies in real-world supply chains may validate if and to what extent the in-

sights developed by this kind of game-theoretic modeling hold in a real-world supply chain
setting.

Development of contracts that are more effective than a Commitment contract in

coordinating this supply chain – increasing consumer surplus and bolstering manufacturer
and retailer profits would also be a valuable and interesting extension of the research
presented in this dissertation.
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APPENDIX
1. Static one-period Cournot duopoly with vertical control
Nomenclature:
i: period, j: retailer, a: model parameter reservation price (a>0) , b: model parameter (b<a),
q0j= order quantity of retailer j in period 0 (there is only one period in this model and we
denote that as period 0 for convenience ), wi :wholesale price set by the manufacturer in

period i (i=1,2), ПRoi : profit of retailer i in period 0 ,ПMo : profit of manufacturer in period
0.

Following is the analysis of the static single period game, using backward induction.

The game starts with the manufacturer announcing a wholesale price w, to which the

retailers respond with order quantities of qo1 and qo2 respectively. In keeping with the

principle of backward induction, we start with the analysis of the retailers' decisions first.
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1.1: Retailers' decisions
Given: (Assumptions)

0< w < a, h>0 , a>0

(1-001)

Decision variables: qo1

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.
a-b(qo1+qo2)>=0
q01 >= 0

We can write the profit-function for retailer 1 as:
ПRo1 = (a− b(q 01+ q 02))(q 01)− ( w q01)

∂ q01
2

(1-003)
(1-004)

∂ Π R01
= a− b( 2q 01+ q 02)− w
∂ q01
∂ 2 Π R01

(1-002)

(1-005)

= − 2b< 0

(1-006)

(1-006) shows that (1-004) is concave in qo1.

Setting (1-005) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing retailer 1 order quantity as:
qo01 =

a− w q2
−
2b
2

(1-007)
a

Rearranging (1-002), we get: qo1<= b − q 02

(1-008)

We need (1-007) to fulfill (1-008) and (1-003) which leads to the following two sub-cases:
Case 3.21(a): If qo01(1-007)<0, q*01 = 0
Case 3.21(b): If qo1(1-008) >=0, q*01=

(1-009)

a− w q2
−
2b
2

Similarly, for retailer 2 we can write:
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(1-010)

qo02 =

a− w q01
−
2b
2

(1-011)

Case 3.21(c): If qo02(1-011)<0, q*02 = 0
Case 3.21(d): If qo02(1-011) >=0, q*02=

(1-012)
a− w q01
−
2b
2

(1-013)

3.22: Combined equilibrium analysis:

From (1-009), (1-010), (1-012) and (1-013), we see that there are two possible equilibria
for the retailers' decisions:
Case 3.21(s-i): If

a− w
< 0, q*01 = q*02 = 0
2b

(1-014)

(1-014) always violates (1-001) and hence it's impossible.
Case 3.21(s-ii): If
q*01=q*02 =

a− w
≥ 0,
2b

a− w
3b

(1-015)

We see that Case 3.21(s-ii), always occurs and hence, there is only one equilibrium for the
retailer's order quantities i.e., q*01=q*02 =

a− w
3b

(1-016)

3.23 Manufacturer's wholesale price decision:
Given:

a> 0, qo1, qo2 >=0

(1-017)

Decision variable: w

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0<=w <=a
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(1-018)

The objective function is to maximize the manufacturer's period profit given in (1-019)
a− w

ПM2= w(2* 3b

)

(1-019)

∂ Π M 2a 4w2
=
−
∂w
3b 3b

(1-020)

 2 ΠM 2  4
=
<0
w 2
3b

(1-021)

2

a

w* = wo = 2 > 0

(1-022)

Summary:

Manufacturer's wholesale price decision:
a

w* = 2

(1-022)

Retailers' order quantity decisions:
q*01=q*02 =

a− w
a
=
3b
6b

(1-023)
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2. Two period-model – one manufacturer supplying identical product to two
identical Cournot duopoly downstream retailers
Nomenclature (all variables are non-negative):
i: period

j: retailer

a: model parameter reservation price (a>0)
b: model parameter (b>0)

qij = order quantity of retailer j in period i (i = 1,2; j = 1,2)

Ij : inventory carried by retailer j from period 1 to period 2

wi : wholesale price set by the manufacturer in period i (i=1,2)

h: holding cost of each retailer to carry one unit of inventory from period 1 to period 2 (it is
assumed that both retailers have the same holding cost)
ПRij : profit of retailer j in period I

ПMi : profit of manufacturer in period i.
We solve this two-period game by backward induction i.e., solving the second period game
first. Since the two retailers are identical in all respects and have equal holding costs, we

can say that, in equilibrium, they carry equal amounts of inventory from the 1 st period to
the second. i.e., I1=I2 = I

Retailer 1's second period decisions
Given: (Assumptions)
0< w2< a

I1, I2≥0, , h>0

(2-1)
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(2-2)

a-b (I1+I2) ≥ 0 OR a-2bI ≥0

(2-3)

Decision variables: q21

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.
a-b(q21+q22+2I)≥0

(2-4)

q21 ≥ 0

(2-5)

We can write the 2nd period profit function for retailer 2 as:
ПR21 =( − (
=

+

− (2q

+ 2I))(

+

+ )−(

)

(2-6)

+ 3I) −

(2-7)

= −2b < 0

(2-8)

(2-8) shows that (2-6) is concave with respect to q21

Setting (2-7) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing 2nd period order quantity for retailer 1
as:

=

−

(2-9)

We need to check that (2-9) fulfills (2-4) and (2-5)
Re-arranging (2-4), we get:
q21≤ − (

+ 2I)

(2-10)

(2-9) can be re-written as:
=(

−

− )−( +

)≤

− (

+ 2I) ≤ − (

+ 2I)

(2-11)

From (2-11), we can say that (2-9) always fulfills (2-10) and (2-2).

Next, we only need to check that (2-9) fulfills (2-5), which leads to the following sub-cases
for the optimal q*21 decision:

Case 1.1(a): If qo21 (9) ≤0, q*21 = 0

(2-12)
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Case 1.1(b): If qo21 (9) > 0, q*21 = qo21(9) =

−

(2-13)

Retailer 2's 2nd period order quantity decisions
Given: (Assumptions)

I1, I2≥0, 0< w2< a, h>0

(2-14)

a-b (I1+I2) ≥ 0 OR a-2bI ≥0

(2-15)

Decision variables: q22

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.

a-b (q21+I1+ q22 +I2) ≥ 0 OR a-b(q21+q22+2I)≥0
q22 ≥ 0

We can write the 2nd period profit function for retailer 1 as:
ПR21 =( − (

+

+ 2I))(

+ )−(

)

(2-16)

(2-17)

(2-18)

Since retailer 2 is symmetrical to retailer 1, we can use a procedure similar to the one

employed in Section 1.1 to derive retailer 2's 2nd period profit-maximizing order quantity as
=

−

(2-19)

For (2-19) to fulfill (2-16) and (2-17), we have the following two sub-cases, again, using a
procedure similar to that used while computing Retailer 1’s decisions.
Case (a): If qo22(2-19) ≤0, q*22 = 0

Case (b): If qo22(2-19) > 0, q*22 = qo22 (2-19) =
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−

(2-20)
(2-21)

Combined equilibrium analysis – q21 and q22 decisions

Since the two retailers are identical in all respects, symmetrical, in Cournot competition
with each other and take their decisions simultaneously, we can postulate that their

equilibrium 2nd period order quantities are equal. In this case, there are only two possible
equilibria:

Case (a): qo21(2-9) ≤0 AND qo22(2-19) ≤0 (Case 1.1(a) and Case 1.2(a))
Here, q*21 = q*22 = 0 (From (2-12) and (2-16)

(2-22)

Here, q*21 =

(2-23)

Case (b): qo21(9) >0 AND qo22(19) >0 (Case 1.1(b) and Case 1.2(b))

q*22 =

−

−

From (2-13)
From (2-21)

(2-24)

Solving (2-23) and (2-24) together, we obtain,
q*21 = q*22 =

−

(2-25)
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Table 1.1: Summary of 2nd period retailer order quantity decisions
Case
No.

S-(a)

S-(b)

Domain Conditions
qo21(2-9) ≤0 AND qo22(2-19) ≤0

Equivalent
Conditions

− ≤0

qo21(2-9) >0 AND qo22(2-19) >0

− ≤0
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Equilibrium Decision
(q*21,q*22)
0,0

− ,

−

2nd period manufacturer wholesale price decisions
Given:

I≥ 0

(2-26)

a-2bI ≥ 0

(2-27)

Decision variable: w2

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0≤w2 ≤a

(2-28)

ПM2= w2 q 21 + q 22 

(2-29)

The objective function is to maximize the manufacturer's 2nd period profit given in (29)

Case (1): a-3bI > w2

In this portion of the w*2 domain,
q*21 = q*22=

−

(From (2-25))

Substituting q*21 and q*22 into (2-29) from (2-25) we get:
ПM2 = (2
=

− 2I)(
−

)

(2-30)

− 2I

(2-31)

 2 ΠM 2  4
=
<0
w 2
3b
2

(2-32) shows that (2-30) is concave with respect to w2.

(2-32)

Equating (2-32) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing 2nd period manufacturer wholesale
price as
wo2 =

(2-33)
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(2-33) needs to satisfy the constraint (2-28) as well as the domain conditions of Case 1.4
(a-3bI>w2 ).

We see that (2-33) always fulfills the RHS of (2-33) and also fulfills the condition,
a-3bI > wo2 , as long as wo2>0, which leads to the following sub-cases:
Case (2-a): If wo2(2-33) ≤0, w*2 = 0

(2-34)

Case (2-b): If wo2(2-33)>0, w*2 =

(2-35)

Case (2): If a-3bI ≤ w2, we see from Table 1.1 that neither retailer orders and w* 2 can be set
at any value such that fulfills (2-28) as well as w2≥a-3bI1

This leads to the following two-cases for the optimal w*2 decision in this case:
Case 2(a): If wo2(2-33)≤ 0, w*2 = 0

Case 2(b): If wo2(2-33) > 0, w*2 = any w2 that fulfills a-3bI1≤w2≤a
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(2-36)

(2-37)

Table 1.2: Summary of 2nd period manufacturer wholesale price decisions
Case No. Domain Conditions
1(a)

I≥

2(a)

a-3bI ≤ 0 OR I≥

1(b)
2(b)

I<
a-3bI>0 OR I<

w*2
0

− 3bI
2
0

Any w*2 such that
a-3bI1≤w*2≤a

From Table 1.2, we see that when I≥ , the equilibrium w*2 decision is always w*2 = 0.
When I< , the manufacturer has a choice of either setting any w* 2 such that a-3bI1≤w*2≤a
OR w*2 =

, when I< .

We postulate that the equilibrium decision in this case will be w* 2 =

, as this

decision will lead to a higher profit for the manufacturer (both retailers order), versus

when a-3bI1≤w*2≤a (neither retailer orders), in which case his profit is zero. This decision
is consistent with the Cournot conjecture that each entity always acts to maximize its own
profit. Hence, there are two possible equilibrium values in this case, depending on the I
value from the 1st period:
Case (s-i): If

≤I≤ , w*2 = 0

(2-38)

Case (s-ii): If I< , w*2 =
We further note that I is never greater than

(2-39)
(from (2-27))
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1st period order quantity decisions for retailer 1
Given: (Assumptions)
a, b, h >0

(2-40)

0≤ w1+h< a

(2-41)

q12≥0

(2-42)

Decision variables: q11, I

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.
q11 ≥ 0

a-b (q11+q12) ≥0

(2-44)

I1 ≥0

(2-45)

a-2bI≥0

We can write the 1st period profit function for retailer 1 as:
ПR11= ( − (

+

(2-43)

))(

)−

(

+ )−ℎ

(2-46

(2-47)

The 1st period problem for retailer 1 is to set a q 11 and I to maximize the sum of 1st and 2nd
period profits. i.e., retailer 1 needs to maximize:
ПR11 + ПR12

There are two possible sub-cases here, based on the 2nd period wholesale price and order
quantities (which determine 2nd period profits)
Case (1): I<
In this case, from Table 1.2, w*2 =
q*21 =q*22 =

− =

and

−

(2-48)
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So, the 2nd period profit function becomes:
ПR21 = (a-b(

+ ))(

+ ) -(

)*(

− )=(

−

)(

+ )−(

)(

− )

(2-49)

Hence, retailer 1's 1st period problem becomes to max:
ПR11 +ПR21 = ( − (

+

))(

)−

(

+ )−ℎ +(

−

)(

+ )−(

)

)(

−

(2-50)

(

)
(

=
)

(

)
(

− 2bq

−

(2-51)

= −2b

= −(
)

−

(2-52)
+ ℎ) +

−

(2-53)

=

(2-54)

(2-52) and (2-54) show that (2-50) is concave in q11 and I respectively.

Setting (2-51) and (2-53) to zero respectively, we get the profit-maximizing q11 and I1
values for retailer 1 as:
=
=

−
−

(2-55)
(

+ ℎ)

(2-56)

Re-arranging (44), we get:
≤ −

We observe that:

(2-57)

=

−

≤

−

≤
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≤ −

(2-58)

i.e., (2-55) always fulfills (2-57) and it's hence enough to check that (55) fulfills (43), which
leads to the following sub-cases for the optimal q*11 decision:
Case 1(a): If qo11(2-55)≤0, q*11 = 0
Case 1(b): If qo11(2-55) > 0, q*11 =

=

−

(2-59)
(2-60)

Also, Io1 (2-56) needs to fulfill (2-45) and (2-46).

we see that Io1(2-56) fulfills (2-45) (using (2-41)).
Also, we see that
Io1(2-57) ≤

=

.

(2-61)

Hence Io1(2-57) fulfills all the domain conditions and hence,
I*1 = Io1(2-57)=

Case (2):

−

(

+ ℎ)

(2-62)

≤I≤

Neither retailer orders in the 2nd period in this case, though w*2 = 0.

Hence, the 2nd period retailer 1 profit is only gained from selling the inventory carried from
the 1st period i.e., ПR21 = (a-2bI)(I)
Hence, ПR11 + ПR21 = ( − (
(

)
(

(

)
)

(

=

− 2bq

))(

)−

−

(

+ ) − ℎ + (a-2bI)(I)

(2-63)
(2-64)

= −2b

= −(
)

−

+

(2-65)
+ ℎ) +

− 4bI

(2-66)

= −4b

(2-67)
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(2-65) and (2-67) show that (2-63) is concave in q11 and I respectively.

Setting (2-64) and (2-66) to zero respectively, we get the profit-maximizing q11 and I1
values for retailer 1 as:
=
=

−

(2-68)

)

(2-69)

(

Re-arranging (2-44), we get:
≤ −

(2-70)

We observe that:

=

−

≤

−

≤

≤ −

(2-71)

i.e., (2-68) always fulfills (44) and it's hence enough to check that (2-68) fulfills (2-43),
which leads to the following sub-cases for the optimal q*11 decision:
Case 2(a): If qo11(68)≤0, q*11 = 0
Case 2(b): If qo11(68) > 0, q*11 =

(2-72)
=

−

(2-73)

Also, Io1 (69) needs to fulfill (2-45) and (2-46).
We see that

=

(

)

≤

≤

(2-74)

Hence, the domain condition for this case i.e.,
optimal I* decision is to carry I* =

≤I≤ , is never satisfied by (69). So, the

, which is the minimum value that fulfills the domain

conditions.

(2-75)
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Retailer 2's 1st period order quantity decision:

Since retailer 2 is symmetrical to retailer 1 (exactly identical with same holding cost and
same amount of inventory carried into the 2nd period),

We have the following two sub-cases for the optimal q*12 and I* decisions in this case:
Case (2-1): I <
Using a procedure exactly similar to Case 1.5, we can obtain the profit-maximizing qo12 and
Io values for this case as:
=
=

−
−

(

(2-76)
+ ℎ)

(2-77)

And the following 2 cases for the optimal q* 12 decisions:
Case 2-1(a): If qo12(76)≤0, q*12 = 0
Case 2-1(b): If qo12(76) > 0, q*12 =
and that I* =

=

−

(

=

−

+ ℎ)

(2-78)
(2-79)
(2-80)

Case (2-2): I1≥
In this case, again from symmetry to Case 1.61, we can derive the following results:
=

−

(2-81)

We have the following two sub-cases for the optimal q*12 decision:
Case 2-2(a): If qo12(81)≤0, q*12 = 0
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(2-82)

Case 2-2(b): If qo12(81) > 0, q*12 =

=

−

(2-83)

and I* =

(2-84)

Combined Equilibrium Analysis

Solving Case 1(a) and 2-1(a) together, we get:
q*11 = q*12 = 0 when

=

−

i.e., q*11 = q*12 = 0 when

≤0 and

=

−

≤0

≤ 0OR w1≥a

(2-85)

However, this directly contradicts (41), which is a given condition and hence this case is
impossible.

We can similarly conclude that the combination of Cases 1.52(a) and 1.62(a) is impossible.
Solving cases 1(b) and 2-1(b) together (1st period retailer 1 and retailer 2 decisions
respectively), we get:
q*11 = q*12 =

when

i.e., q*11 = q*12 =

=

when

−

>0 AND

=

−

>0

> 0 or w1 < a,, which we know from (1.52), always holds.

The combination of Case 2(b) and Case 2-2(b) also yields the same result i.e.
q*11 = q*12 =

(2-86)
(2-87)

Hence, the only possible equilibrium for 1st period q11 and q12 decisions is
q*11 = q*12 =

(2-88)

As for the optimal I* decisions, we have the following:
If I< , I* =

=

−

(

+ ℎ)

(2-89)
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If

≤I≤ , I* =

≤

We recall from 2-74) that in the case of

(2-90)
≤I≤ , the profit-maximizing Io1 value is below

the lower bound of the domain. Also, from (2-67), we see that the function is concave and
hence, we can say that the profit of retailer 1 is strictly decreasing in I, in the interval
<I≤ .

(2-91)

Also, we see from (2-65) and (2-67) that, the profit-maximizing Io1 value in the interval
I> , always is <

, and that the profit function for that interval too is concave, hence, we

know that the profit-function for retailer 1 in the interval (Io1(2-62)≤I≤ ) is also strictly
decreasing in I.

(2-92)

Further, we see that the profit functions of the retailers in the two intervals, (2-49) and (259), respectively, yield the same value at I =

, (when I= , w*2 =

=0 and q*21 = q*22 =

− =0), so (2-49) reduces to (2-59).
So, we can see that the profit-function for retailer 1 is continuous at I= , and we have
shown that the profit-function is strictly decreasing in the interval (Io1(2-80)≤I≤ ), as well
as the interval

<I< . So, we can argue that the profit-maximizing I* decision has to be

that I* always lies in the interval I< , since there is no I value that yields a higher profit
than the profit when I* = Io1(2-80).
Hence, the optimal I* decision for retailer 1 is I* = Io1 (2-80) =

−

Similarly, the optimal I* decision for retailer 2 is also I* = Io (2-80) =
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(

+ ℎ).
−

(

(2-93)
+ ℎ) (2-94)

1st period manufacturer wholesale price decisions
Given:

a, b, > 0

(2-95)

q11, q12, I ≥0

(2-96)

Decision variable: w1

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0≤w1 +h≤a

(2-97)

The objective of the manufacturer in the 1st period is to maximize the sum of 1st and 2nd
period profits i.e., maximize:

ПM1 + ПM2 = w1(q11+q12+2I*)+w2(q*21+q*22)

(2-98)

We see from the previous section, equation that there is only 1 possibility for optimal q* 11,
q*12, I*, q*21, q*22, w*2 decisions combined. Hence, we have the following 2 cases for the
optimal w*1 decision:
In this case, w*2 =
I* =

=

(

−

+ (

+ ℎ), q*21 = q*22 =

+ ℎ); q*11 = q*12 =

+

, I* =

(

+ ℎ),

−

(

+ ℎ)

Substituting these into (2-98), we have:

ПM1 + ПM2 =(6*h+a+6*w[1])^2/(150*b)+w[1]*(2*((4*a)/(15*b)(2*(h+w[1]))/(5*b))+(2*(a-w[1]))/(3*b)) (2-99)
(

)

=

=−

(

)

(2-100)

≤0

(2-101)

(2-101) shows that (2-99) is concave in w1. Setting (2-100) to zero, we get the profitmaximizing wo1 for this case as:
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wo1 =

(2-102)

We see that (2-102) is always ≥0 and is always ≤ a
–> w*1 = wo1 (2-102) =

(2-103)

Summary of decision variable values – 2 period model:
w*1 = =
q*11 = q*12 =
I* =
w*2 =

−

=
(

+ ℎ)=

; q*21 = q*22 =0
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3. Three-period model with one-manufacturer supplying to one downstream
retailer with Strategic Inventory carriage allowed between periods.

3rd period retailer decisions
Given: (Assumptions)

I1, I2≥0, 0< w3< a, h>0

(3-1)

0<w2<a, 0<w1<a

(3-2)

a-bI1 ≥0

(3-4)

a-bI2 ≥0

(3-3)

q1 , q2 ≥0

(3-5)

Decision variables: q3

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.
a- b(q3 + I2)≥0
q3 ≥ 0

We can write the 3rd period profit function for the retailer as:
ПR3 =( − (
= −2(

+ ))(

+ ) +

+ )−(

)

−

(3-6)

(3-7)
(3-8)
(3-9)

= −2b

(3-10)

(3-9) and (3-10) prove that (3-8) is concave in q3.

Setting (3-9) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing q3 decision as:
qo3 =

−

(3-11)

We now need (3-11) to fulfill the constraints (3-6) and (3-7).
Rearranging (3-6), we have: q3< − .

(3-12)
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We note that (3-11) readily fulfills the constraint in (3-12). Hence, we have the following
sub-cases for the optimal q*3 decision:
Case 7.1(a): If qo3 (3-11)≤0, qo3 = 0

(3-13)

Case 7.1(b): If qo3(3-11)>0, q*3 = qo3(3-11) =

−

(3-14)

3rd period Manufacturer decisions:
Given:

I2 ≥ 0

(3-15)

a- bI2 ≥ 0

(3-16)

q2 > =0

(3-17)

Decision variable: w3

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0≤w3≤a

(3-18)

The objective function is to maximize the manufacturer's 3 rd period profit given in (3-19)
ПM2=

( )

(3-19)

Case (1): a-2bI2 > w3

In this portion of the w*3 domain,
q*3=

−

(From (3-11) )

(3-20)

Substituting q*3 from (3-11) into (3-20), we get:
ПM3 = (
=
=

− )(
−

)

(3-21)

−

(3-22)

<0

(3-23)

(3-23) shows that (3-21) is concave with respect to w3.
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Equating (3-22) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing 3rd period manufacturer wholesale
price as wo3 =

(3-24)

We now need that (3-24) fulfills the constraint (3-18) as well as the particular domain
condition for this case i.e., 0≤w3≤a AND a-2bI2 > w3.

We observe that a-2bI2 >w3 is always satisfied by wo3(7-024), hence we only need to check
for the condition 0≤w3≤a.

(3-25)

Case 1(a): If wo3(3-24) ≤0. w*3=wo3 =0

(3-26)

Case 1(b): If wo3(3-24)>0, w*3 = wo3 =

(3-27)

This leads to the following two cases for the optimal w* 3 decision:

Case 2: a-2bI2 ≤ w3

In this portion of the w*3 domain,
q*3= 0

(3-28)

ПM3 = 0

(3-29)

Substituting q*3 from (3-11) into (3-20), we get:
Here it does not matter what the w*3 is set at, since q*3 = 0.

Hence the optimal w*3 is the max. allowed by the domain conditions i.e., 0≤w3≤a AND a2bI2 .

→ w*3 = a

(3-30)

Table 2.1: Summary of w*3 decisions
Case No.

Domain Conditions

w*3 decision
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Case 1(a) a-2bI2 > w3 AND

Case 1(b) a-2bI2 > w3 AND
Case 2

0

≤0

≥0 w*3 =

a-2bI2 ≤ w3

w*3 = a

From Table 2.1, it is apparent that the manufacturer has a choice in the 3rd period to set the
wholesale price either in the range a-2bI2 > w3 OR a-2bI2 ≤ w3, depending on in which part
of the region, the manufacturer makes a better profit.

Computing the profit functions at the three wholesale price levels we have:
(

* = 0) = 0

(

*=

(

* = ) =0

)=(

− )(

)=

(3-31)
(3-32)
(3-33)

>0
4I
I2 ≥

− 4I
± (

+

≥0
(

))

=

± (

(

))

I2 ≥
We see that (3-32) ≥0 if I2 ≥ . We also know that one of the domain conditions for the
profit function value in (3-32) to hold is:
and a-2bI2>w3 i.e., a-2bI2 >

≥0 → I2≤

which always holds.

We see that, at I2= , which is the only point at which Case 1(b) holds, w* 3 reduces to
w*3 = 0. So, the decisions in Table 2.1 can be reduced to:
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Table 2.2: Summary of w*3 decisions
Case
Domain
w*3
No.
Conditions
Case
(a)
Case
(b)

a-2bI2 > w3

w*3 = 0

a-2bI2 ≤ w3

w*3 = a

In either case, the profit-function is zero, and hence we can say that w*3 = a is the optimal
solution, since, with all things being equal, the manufacturer would want to set his
wholesale price at the higher point.

(3-34)

2nd period retailer decision:
Given: (Assumptions)
I1 ≥0

(3-35)

0< w2< a, h>0
0<w1<a

`

a-bI2 ≥0
q1 ≥0

(3-36)

(3-37)

(3-38)
(3-39)

Decision variables: q2 , I2

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables:
a-b (q2 + I1)≥0

(3-40)

I2≥0

(3-42)

q2 ≥ 0

(3-41)

a-b(I2) ≥0

We can write the 2nd period problem for the retailer (to set q*2) as to maximize:
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(3-43)

ПR2 + ПR3 =( − (
(

)
(

= −2(
)

+ ))(
+ ) +

+ )−(

)(

+ )−ℎ

+0

−

(3-45)

= −2b

(

)

= −(

(

)

=0

(3-44)

(3-46)
+ ℎ)

(3-47)
(3-48)

(3-46) proves that (3-44) is concave in q2.
Setting (3-45) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing qo2 value as:
qo2 =

−

(3-49)

We now need that qo2(3-45) fulfill the constraints (3-40) and (3-41).
Rearranging (3-40) we get: q2≤ −

(3-50)

We see that qo2(3-49) readily fulfills (3-50) and hence (3-40).

For qo2(3-49) to fulfill (3-41),we have the following sub-cases:
Case (a): If qo2(3-49) ≤0, q*2 = 0
Case (b): If qo2(3-49)>0, q*2 = qo2(3-49) =

(3-51)
−

(3-52)

As far as the I*2 decision, we see from (3-47) and (3-48) that the derivative of (3-44) with

respect to I2 is constant and hence the I*2 can be set at the maximum allowed by the domain
conditions i.e., (3-47) and (3-48).
→ I*2 =

(3-53)
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2nd Period Manufacturer Decisions:
Given:

I1≥ 0

(3-54)

a- bI1 ≥ 0

(3-55)

q1> =0

(3-56)

Decision variable: w2

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0≤w2≤a

(3-57)

The objective function is to maximize the sum of the manufacturer's 2 nd and 3rd period
profit given in (3-58)
ПM2 + ПM3 =

Case (1a): If w2≥a-2bI1

(

+ )+

( )

(3-58)

Here, q*2 = 0, I*2 = (and w*3 =a, q*3 = 0)
hence the manufacturer's problem becomes to maximize:
ПM2 + ПM3 =
(
(

( )+

( )= w2( )

(3-59)

)

=

(3-60)

)

=0

(3-61)

From (3-60) and (3-61), we see that the first derivative of (3-59) with respect to w2 is a
constant. Hence, w*2 here is set at the maximum allowed by the domain conditions i.e.,
w2≥a-2bI1 AND 0≤w2≤a

So, w*2 = a is the optimal decision here.

(3-62)
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Case 1(b): If w2<a-2bI1
Here, q*2 =

− and hence the manufacturer's problem becomes to maximize:

ПM2 + ПM3 =
(
(

( )+

)

=

(

)

=−

( )= w2(

− )

(3-63)

)

(3-64)
(3-65)

(3-64) and (3-65) prove that (3-63) is concave in w2.

Setting (3-65) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing wo2 in this case as:
wo2 = −

(3-66)

Now, we need that wo2(3-66) fulfills the constraint (3-57) as well as the domain condition:

w2<a-2bI1. We observe that wo2(3-66) always fulfills the constant w2≤a-2bI1 . We only need
to check that wo2(3-66) fulfills the constraint (3-57) .

From (3-55) we observe that wo2(3-66) is always ≥0 and <=a
w*2 = wo2(3-66) = = −

is the optimal w*2 decision in this area of the w*2 domain (3-67)

Table 2.3: Summary of 2nd period manufacturer wholesale price decision:
Case No.

Domain Conditions

Case 1(b-i)

If w2<a-2bI1

Case 1(a)

If w2≥a-2bI1

w*2 value
w*2 = a

w*2=

−

Whether the manufacturer sets wo2 in the range w2 ≥ a-2bI1 OR w2 < a-2bI1, depends on
which part of the domain he/she makes a better profit.
+

( * = )= w2(q2) + w3(q3)=a(a/b) =
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(3-68)

+

( *= −

=w2(q2) + w3(q3)= ( −

)
)(

− ) = 0.5

+

.

− 0.5a

(3-69)

We know that the max. value of I1 is a/b, since it needs to fulfill a-bI1>=0.
Substituting I1=a/b in (3-69), we have:
+

*= −

;

=

=

.

(3-70)

So, we conclude that (3-68) is always less than (3-69), and hence:
w*2 = a is the optimal w*2 decision here.
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(3-71)

1st period retailer decision:
Given: (Assumptions)
0<w1<a

`

Decision variables: q1 . I1

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables:
a- b(q1 + I1)≥0

(3-72)

(3-73)

q 1≥ 0

(3-74)

I1 ≥0

(3-76)

a-bI1≥0

(3-75)

The 1st period problem for the retailer as to maximize: ПR1 + ПR2 + ПR3
here,

w*2 = a; q*2 = 0, I*2 = ; w*3 =a, q*3 = 0

 ПR1 + ПR2 + ПR3
=(a-b(q1))(q1)-w1(q1+I1)-hI1 + (a-b(I1))( I1) - a( ) – hI2 + (a-b( ))( )

(3-77)

And
(

)
(

(

)
)

(

= −2bq +

−

= −2b

= −ℎ − 2bI +
)

(3-78)
(3-79)
−

(3-80)

= −2b

(3-81)

(3-79) and (3-81) prove that (3-78) and (3-80) are concave in q1 and I1 respectively.
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Setting (3-78) and (3-80) to zero respectively, we get the profit-maximizing q1 and I1
decisions as:
→ qo1 =
Io1 =

(

(3-82)
)

(3-83)

q1(3-82) needs to fulfill (3-73) and (3-74). We know w1≤a (from (3-72)).

So, we can say that (3-82) always fulfills (3-73). We now check if (3-82) fulfills (3-74).
Rearranging (3-74) we get:

< −

(3-84)

We now need to check that (3-82) fulfills (3-84) .
For this, we have the following sub-cases:

Case (a): If w1< − 2bI , q*1 = qo1(3-82) =

(3-85)

Case (b): If w1≥ − 2bI , q*1 = qo1(3-82) = − 2bI

(3-86)

Next, we check if (3-83) fulfills (3-75) and (3-76).

We see that (3-75) readily fulfills (3-75) and (3-76) since w1<a always and a>>h
I*1 = Io1 =

(

)

is the optimal I*1 decision here.

Table 2.4 Summary of 1st period retailer decisions –(q*1):
Case No.
Domain
q*1 decision
Conditions
Case
2.5(a)

Case
2.5(b)

If w1< − 2bI
If w1≥ − 2bI

q*1 =

q*1 =

− 2bI
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(3-87)

(

We know from (3-87) that I*1 =

)

. Using this in Case (a) and (b), we see that the

domain condition of case (a) reduces to h>0, which always holds. Also, we see that, using
this result, the domain condition for case (b) reduces to h<0, which is infeasible.
Hence, we conclude that : q*1 =

is the only optimal q*1 decision in this case

1st Period Manufacturer Decisions:
Given:

a, b >0

(3-88)

Decision variable: w1

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0≤w1≤a-h

The manufacturer's profit function over the three periods becomes:
+

+

=

Here, q*1 =

(

+ )+

(

and I*1 =

)

(

+ )+

( )

(3-89)
(3-90)

, w*2 =a-h, q*2 = 0, I*2 = , w*3 =a, q*3 = 0 (From previous

sections)

Hence, the manufacturer's 1st period problem becomes:
+

+

=

(

+

+

)+(

(

)

=

(

(

)

=

<0

(

)

) + ( − ℎ)( )

+

(

)

)

(3-91)
(3-92)
(3-93)

(3-93) provea that (3-91) is concave in w1. Setting (3-92) to zero, we get the profitmaximizing w1 in this case as:
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w1 = −

(3-94)

since a>>h, we can say that w1(3-94) ≥0. We also observe that w1(3-94) fulfills the RHS of
(3-95)

Hence w*1 = −

is the optimal w*1 decision.

SUMMARY – Anand's three period model:
1st period:

w*1 = − ; q*1 =

=

(

)

=

+

; I*1 =

2nd period:
w*2 =a, q*2 = 0, I*2 =
3rd period:

w*3 =a, q*3 = 0
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(

)

4. Three period Cournot duopoly Model

Key Assumption: Inventory is carried only one period forward.
three period Game Structure:
1st period




manufacturer announces w1
retailers announce q11, q12 and I1 (each)
sell q11, q12, carry I1 to period 2

2nd period:





manufacturer announces w2
retailers announce q21, q22, I2. (each)
sell q21 + I1, q22 + I1 respectively.
Carry I2 to the 3rd period.

3rd period:




manufacturer announces w3
retailers announce q31, q32 respectively.
sell q31+I2, q32+I2 respectively.

Retailer 1's third period decisions
Given: (Assumptions)
0< w2< a

(4-1)

I1, I2≥0, , h>0

(4-2)

a-2bI2 ≥0

(4-3)
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Decision variables: q21

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.
a-b(q31+q32+2I2)≥0

(4-4)

q21 ≥ 0

(4-5)

We can write the 3rd period profit function for retailer 2 as:
ПR31 =( − (
=

+

− (2q

+ 2I ))(

+

+ )−(

)

(4-6)

+ 3I ) −

(4-7)

= −2b < 0

(4-8)

(4-8) shows that (4-6) is concave with respect to q31

Setting (4-7) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing 3rd period order quantity for retailer 1
as:

=

−

(4-9)

(4-7) shows that (4-6) is concave with respect to q31

Setting (4-6) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing 3rd period order quantity for retailer 1
as:

=

−

(4-10)

We need that (4-8) fulfills (4-3) and (4-4)
Re-arranging (4-3), we get:
q31≤ − (

+ 2I )

(4-11)

(4-8) can be re-written as:
=(

−

− )−( +

)≤

− (

+ 2I ) ≤ − (
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+ 2I )

(4-12)

From (4-12), we can say that (4-9) always fulfills (4-3).

Next, we only need that (4-9) fulfills (4-4), which leads to the following sub-cases for the
optimal q*31 decision:

Case (a) If qo31 (4-9) ≤0, q*31 = 0

(4-13)

Case (b): If qo31(4-9) > 0, q*31 = qo31(4-9) =

−

(4-14

Retailer 2's 3rd period order quantity decisions
Given: (Assumptions)

I1, I2≥0, 0< w3< a, h>0

(4-15)

0<w2<a, 0<w1<a

(4-16)

a-2bI2 ≥0

(4-17)

Decision variables: q32

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.
a- b(q31+q32+2I2)≥0
q32 ≥ 0

We can write the 3rd period profit function for retailer 2 as:
ПR32 =( − (

+

+ 2I ))(

+ )−(

)

(4-18)
(4-19)

(4-20)

Since retailer 2 is symmetrical to retailer 1, we can use a procedure similar to the one

employed in Section 3.1 to derive retailer 2's 2nd period profit-maximizing order quantity as
=

−

(4-21)

For (4-22) to fulfill (4-16) and (4-17), we have the following two sub-cases, again, using a
procedure similar to that in Section 3.1
Case (a) If qo32(4-21) ≤0, q*32 = 0

(4-22)
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Case (b): If qo32(4-21) > 0, q*32 = qo32(4-21) =

−

(4-23)

Combined equilibrium analysis – q31 and q32 decisions

Since the two retailers are identical in all respects, symmetrical, in Cournot competition
with each other and take their decisions simultaneously, we can postulate that their

equilibrium 3rd period order quantities are equal. In this case, there are only two possible
equilibria:

Case (a): qo31(4-13) ≤0 AND qo32(4-22) ≤0 (Case 3.1(a) and Case 3.2(a))
Here, q*31 = q*32 = 0

(4-24)

Here, q*31 =

(4-25)

Case (b): qo31(4-13) >0 AND qo32(4-22) >0 (Case 3.1(b) and Case 3.2(b))

q*32 =

−

−

(4-26)

Solving (4-26) and (4-27) together, we obtain,
q*31 = q*32 =

−

(4-27)

Table 3.1: Summary of 3rd period retailer order quantity decisions
Case No.
3.3(a)
3.3(b)

Domain ConditionsEquivalent
Conditions

qo31(4-13) ≤0 AND
qo32(4-22) ≤0

qo31(4-13) >0 AND
qo32(4-22) >0

− ≤0
− >0

Equilibrium Decision
(q*31,q*32)
0,0

− ,

−

3rd period manufacturer wholesale price decisions
Given:

I2 ≥ 0
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(4-28)

a-2bI2 ≥ 0

(4-29)

q21, q22 > =0

(4-30)

Decision variable: w3

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0≤w3≤a

(4-31)

The objective function is to maximize the manufacturer's 2nd period profit given in (5-033)
ПM2=

(

+

)

(4-32)

Case (1): If a-3bI2 > w3

In this portion of the w*3 domain,from (4-27),
q*31 = q*32=

−

Substituting q*31 and q*32 from (4-27) into (4-32), we get:
ПM3 = (2
=
=

− 2I )(
−

)

(4-33)

− 2I

(4-34)

<0

(4-35)

(4-35) shows that (4-33) is concave with respect to w3.

Equating (4-34) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing 3rd period manufacturer wholesale
price as
wo3 =

(4-36)

Now, (4-36) needs to satisfy the constraint (4-31) as well as the domain conditions of Case
3.41 (a-3bI2>w3 )

We see that (4-36) always fulfills the RHS of (4-31) and also fulfills the domain condition,
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a-3bI2 > wo3, as long as wo3>0. This leads to the following sub-cases:
Case 1(a): If wo3(4-36) ≤0, w*3 = 0

(4-37)

Case 1(b): If wo3(4-37)>0, w*3 =

(4-38)

Case (2): If a-3bI ≤ w3, q*31 = q*32 = 0 (neither retailer orders) and w*3 can be set at any
value such that fulfills (4-31) as well as w3≥a-3bI2

This leads to the following two-cases for the optimal w*3 decision in this case:
Case 2(a): If wo3(4-36)≤ 0, w*3 = 0

Case 2(b): If wo3(4-36) > 0, w*3 = a-3bI2

(4-39)

(4-40)

Table 3.2: Summary of 3rd period manufacturer wholesale price decisions
Case
No.

3.41(a)

3.41(b)
3.42(a)
3.42(b)

Domain
Conditions
I2≥
I2<
a-3bI2 ≤ 0 OR
I2≥
a-3bI2>0 OR
I2<

w*3
0

− 3bI
2
0
w*3 = a3bI2

From Table 3.2, we see that when I2≥ , the equilibrium w*3 decision is always w*3 = 0.
When I2< , the manufacturer has a choice of either setting any w* 2 = a-3bI2 OR w*3 =
.
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The equilibrium decision in this case will be w*3=

as this decision will lead to a higher

profit for the manufacturer (both retailers order), versus when a-3bI2≤w*3≤a (neither
retailer orders), in which case his profit is zero. This decision is consistent with the

Cournot conjecture that each entity always acts to maximize it's own profit. Hence, there
are two possible equilibrium values in this case, depending on the I 1 value from the 1st
period:

Case (i): If

≤I2, w*3= 0

(4-41)

Case (ii): If I2< , w*3 =any w*3 that fulfills a-3bI1<=w2<=a
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(4-42)

2nd period retailer's decisions:
Given: (Assumptions)
I1 ≥0, h>0

(4-43)

a-2bI1≥0

(4-45)

0<w2<a,

(4-44)

Decision variables: q21, q22, I2

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.
a- b(q21+q22+2I1)≥0

(4-46)

a-2bI2 ≥0

(4-48)

q21 ≥ 0

(4-47)

I2≥0

We can write the 2nd period profit function for retailer 1 as:
ПR21= ( − (

+

+ 2I ))(

+ )−

(

+ )−ℎ

(4-49)
(4-50)

The 1st period problem for retailer 1 is to set a q 21 and I2 to maximize the sum of 2nd and
3rd period profits. i.e., retailer 1 needs to maximize:
ПR21 + ПR31

There are two possible sub-cases here, based on the 2nd period wholesale price and order
quantities (which determine 2nd period profits)
Case (1): In the part of the I*2 domain - I2<
Her,e from (4-41) and (4-42) w*3 =
q*31 =q*32 =

− =

and

−

(4-51)

So, the 2nd period profit function becomes:
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ПR21 = (a-b(

+ ))(

+ ) -(

)*(

− )=(

−

)(

+ )−(

)(

− )
(4-52)

Hence, retailer 2nd period problem becomes to max:
ПR21 +ПR31 = ( − (
(

)(
(

+ 2I ))(

+ )−

(

+ )−ℎ +(

− )
)

(

=
)

(

+

)
(

)(

+ )−
(4-53)

− 2bq

−

− 3bI −

(4-54)

= −2b< 0

= −(
)

−

=−

(4-55)

+ ℎ) + ( ) −

(4-56)

<0

(4-57)

(4-55) and (4-57) show that (4-53) is concave in q21 and I2 respectively.

Setting (4-54) and (4-56) to zero respectively, we get the profit-maximizing q21 and I2
values for retailer 1 as:
=
=

−
−

(4-58)
(

+ ℎ)

(4-59)

Similarly, we can write for retailer 2:
=
=

−
−

(4-60)
(

+ ℎ)

(4-61)

We note that the qo22 values are independent of the Io2 values.
Solving (4-58) and (4-60) together, we get:
qo21 = qo22 =

−

(4-62)
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We now need that (4-62) fulfills (4-46) and (4-47) as well as the domain conditions for this
sub-case i.e., I2< .
Rearranging (4-46) we get:
q21 ≤ − (

+ 2I )

(4-63)

since q21 = q22, we can write (4-63) as: q21 ≤

− .

(4-64)

We observe that (4-62) always fulfills (4-64).

Now we only need to check that (4-62) fulfills (4-47), which leads to the following twocases for the optimal q*21 decision:
Case 1(a) If qo21 (4-62)≤0, q*21 = 0

(4-65)

Case 1(b): If qo21>0, q*21 = qo21(4-62) =

−

(4-66)

Further, we need that (4-60) (and (4-61) which is the identical value for retailer 2) fulfills
(4-48), (4-49) as well as the domain conditions for this case i.e., I 2<
I2<

together, we observe that we need only I2<

. From (4-47) and

and if this condition is satisfied, (4-47) is

automatically satisfied.
We further observe that Io2(4-61) is always <

. We only need to check that (4-61) fulfills

(4-49), which leads to the following sub-cases for the optimal I*2 decision:
Case 1(c): If Io2(4-61) < 0, then I*2 =0
Case 1(d): If Io2(4-61) > =0, I*2 =

−

(

+ ℎ)

(4-67)
(4-68)

We can obtain a similar 4 sub-cases for the q*22 and I*2 decisions of retailer 2, exactly
identical to those for retailer 1.i.e.,
Case 1(e) If qo22 (4-62)≤0, q*22 = 0

(4-69)
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Case 1(f): If qo22>0, q*22 = qo22(4-62) =

−

(4-70)

Case 1(g): If Io2(4-61) < 0, then I*2 =0
Case1(h): If Io2(4-61) > =0, I*2 =

−

Case (2):When I 2 is in the range:

<I2<

(4-71)
(

+ ℎ)

(4-72)

In this case, w*3 = 0 (from 5-043) and q*31 = q*32 = 0 (from Table 3.1, Case 3.3(a)). Hence
the 3rd period profit becomes:
= (a-2bI2)(I2)

Hence, retailer 2nd period problem becomes to max:
ПR21 +ПR31 = ( − (
(

)
(

=
)

(

)
(

− 2bq

−

+ 2I ))(

+ )−

− 3bI −

+ ℎ) +

(

+ ) − ℎ + (a-2bI2)(I2)

(4-74)
(4-75)

= −2 < 0

= −(
)

+

(4-73)

(4-76)
− 4bI

(4-77)

= −4 < 0

(4-78)

(4-76) and (4-78) prove that (4-74) is concave in q21 and I2 respectively. Setting (4-75) and
(4-77) to zero respectively, we obtain the profit-maximizing q21 and I2 respectively as:
qo21 =
Io2 =

−
(

(

)

(4-79)

)

(4-80)

Similarly, we can obtain for retailer 2:
qo22 =

−

(

)

(4-81)
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Io2 =

(

)

(4-82)

Solving (4-79) and (4-81) together, we get: qo21 = qo22 =

−

(4-83)

We need that (4-80) (and 4-82) fulfill the constraints (4-48), (4-49) as well as the domain
condition for this sub-case

≤I2≤ .

We also observe that (4-80) and (4-82) is always ≤ .
Hence, I*2 =

is the optimal I*2 decision in this case.

(4-84)

Summary of q*21 and I*2 decisions:

Two cases for optimal q*21 decisons:
Case 2-S(a): If

− ≤0, q*21 = 0 (w2 ≥ a-3bI1)

Case 2-S(b): If

− >-0, q*21 = =

I*2 =

−

(4-85)
(w2 < a-3bI1)

always.

We can similarly obtain the decisions for retailer 2

Table 3.3: Summary of 2nd period retailer decisions – order quantity (q*21, q*22)
Case
Domain
Equilibrium values
No.
Conditions
q (S-i)

q (S-ii)

If
If

− ≤0
− >0

q*21=q*22=0

q*21 = q*22 =

−

Table 3.4: Summary of 2nd period retailer decisions – Inventory quantities (I*2)
Case
Domain Conditions
Equilibrium values
No.
I-(S-i) If I2<

I-(S-ii) If I2<

I-(S-iii)

AND

AND

If

−

−

≤I2<

(

(

+ ℎ)< 0

+ ℎ)≥ 0 I*2 =
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I*2 = 0
−

I*2 =

(

+ ℎ)

(4-86)

From Table 3.4 above, we can see that, the retailers can set I* 2 either in the region I2<
(in which case, the options are: I*2 = 0 OR I*2 =

−

(

+ ℎ)) or in the region I2≥ (in

which case I*2 = ). Which value is chosen ultimately depends on, in which region of the I* 2
domain, the retailers make more profit. We now check the profit values for each of the I* 2

options in the following (we use q*21 = q*22=0, for ease of computation, since the q* 21 and
q*22 values are independent of the I*2 values and hence it does not matter at which q* 21,

q*22 level, we compare the profit-functions to find which I*2 value yields the most profit)
ПR21 +ПR31 (I*2 = 0) = ( − (2I ))( ) −

( )−ℎ +(

= ( − (2I ))( )+ ( )( ) − ( )( )= ( − 2
=2

+

( .

)

)(

=

.

−

(

− )

)

(

+ ℎ)) = ( − (2I ))( ) −

( )−ℎ +(

−

)(

+ )−

)
.

+

.

−2

−2

+

+

)= ( − (

= ( − (2I ))( ) −
.

=

)(

− )

ПR21 +ПR31 (I*2 =

=

)+

+ )−(

(4-87)
−

(

=

)(

+

ПR21 +ПR31 (I*2 =
(

−

.

.

+

−

.

+

+ 2I ))(

.

+

+ )−

(4-88)
(

+

) − ℎ + (a-2bI2)(I2)

( ) − ℎ + (a-2bI2)(I2) =
−

.

+

(4-89)

The max value of I1 is I1 =
(4-87) at I1 =

becomes:

( .

)

(4-90)
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.

(4-88) at I1= become:

−
( .

(4-89) at I1= become:

( .
)

+

)

+

( .

( .
)

)

+

( .

−

( .

)

−

( .

)

+

( .

)

)

(4-91)
(4-92)

since a>>h, and a>w1 we can ignore the terms in (4-90), (4-91) and (4-92), so now,
(4-90) becomes:

( .

)

(4-91) becomes:

( .

)

−

( .

)

(4-92) becomes:

( .

)

−

( .

)

(4-93)
+

( .

)

<<

( .

)

+

( .

)

(4-94)
(4-95)

It is clear from (4-93), (4-94) and (4-95), that (4-93) and (4-94) are always greater than (495).

Hence, we can say that the retailers will always set their I*2 in the range I2< , in which
case, the equilibrim I*2 decision is taken as per the following two subcases:
Table 3.5: Summary of I*2 decisions
I-(S-i) If
− ( + ℎ)<
I-(S-ii) If
−

(

−

0

(
0

+ ℎ)< 0 →

+ ℎ)≥ I*2 =
<(

I*2 = 0
−
ℎ)

+ ℎ)→ w2>

(
−ℎ
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+

Manufacturer's 2nd period decisions:
Given:

I1≥ 0

(4-96)

a-2bI1 ≥ 0

(4-97)

a-b(q21+q22+2I1)≥0

(4-98)

a-b(q21+q22)≥0

(4-99)

q21 q22 > =0

(4-100)

Decision variable: w2

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0≤w2≤a

(4-101)

The objective function is to maximize the sum of manufacturer's 2nd period and 3 rd period
profit profit given in (5-096)
ПM2+ПM3=

(

+

+ 2I ) +

There are two main subcases here:
Case (1): If I1 >

(

+

)

+

Here, from Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5:
q*21 = q*22 = 0, I*2 = 0,

Substituting q*21, q*22 and I*2 into (5-096) from (5-097) we get:
ПM2 + ПM3 = w*2(0)+(
(

)
(

(4-102)

)(2*

− )

(4-103)

(4-104)

=0

(4-105)

)

(4-106)

=0

(4-104) and (4-105) prove that (4-098) is constant with respect to w2.
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So, w*2 here is set at the maximum permissible by the domain conditions i.e.,
I1 >

+

AAND 0≤w2≤a

(4-107)

→ w*2 = a is the optimal w*2 decision in this case.

Case (2): If I1 ≤

(4-108)

+

Here, from Tables 3.3 and 3.4:
q*21 = q*22 =

− AND I*2 =

−

(

+ ℎ), ( I*2 is <

, hence, w*3 =

(4-109)

Substituting q*21, q*22 and I*2 into (5-096) from (5-116) we get:
ПM2 + ПM3 = w*2(q*21+q*22+2I*2) + w*3 (q*31+q*32)
ПM2 + ПM3 = 2(

−

+

−

(

+ ℎ))(

= 2(

−

+

−

(

+ ℎ))(

)+

= 2(

−

+

−

(

+ ℎ))(

)+ (

(

)
(

=
)

(

(

)+

(

(
)

(

)

(4-110)
)(2* (

)(2*

− )

(

)

)(

)

)

)

− ))
(4-111)
(4-112)

(4-113)

=

(4-114)

(4-128) proves that (4-126) is concave in w2.

Setting (5-127) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing w*2 as :
wo2 =

(4-115)
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we now need to check that wo2(4-115) fulfills the domain conditions for this case i.e.,
I1 ≤

+

AND 0≤w2≤a

We see that (4-115) easily fulfills these constraints and hence.
w*2 = wo2(4-115) =

(4-116)

Table 3.6: Summary of w*2 decisions:
Case S-I:
Case S-II:

Case No.

Constraint

If I1 ≤
I1 >

+

Optimal w*2 value:
∗

=

w*2 = a

+
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1st period retailer 1 decisions:_
Given: (Assumptions)
h>0

0< w1< a

`

Decision variables: q11,q12 . I1

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.
a- b(q11+q12)≥0

(4-117)

(4-118)

(4-119)

q1 1 ≥ 0

(4-120)

I1≥0

(4-122)

a-2bI1 ≥0

(4-121)

We can write the 1st period profit function for retailer 1 as:
ПR11 =( − (
−

(

+

))(

+ )−ℎ

)−

(

+( − (

+ )−ℎ +( − (
+

+ 2I ))(

+

+ )−

+ 2I ))(

+ )

(4-123)

The 1st period problem for retailer 1 is to set a q 11 and I1 to maximize the sum of 1st, 2nd and
3rd period profits. i.e., retailer 1 needs to maximize:
ПR11 + ПR21 +ПR31
Case (1): If I1 >

(4-124)

+

Here, q*21 = q*22 = 0, I*2 = 0 , w*2 = a and w*3 =

,

q*31 = q*32 = 0

(4-125)

Substituting the values from (4-125) into the retailer profit function over the three periods,
we get:

ПR11 + ПR21 +ПR31 =(a-b(q11+q12))(q11) – w1(q11+I1)-hI1 + (a-b(q21+q22+2I1))(q21+I1) w2(q21+I2)-hI2+ (a-b(q31+q32+2I2))(q31+I2) -w3q31

= (a-b(q11+q12))(q11) – w1(q11+I1)-hI1 + (a-2bI1 )(I1)
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(4-126)

(4-127)

(

)
(

=
)

(

)
(

− 2bq

−

(4-128)

= −2b< 0

=
)

−

(4-129)

− ℎ − 4bI −

(4-130)

= −4b< 0

(4-131)

(4-129) and (4-131) prove that (4-128) Is concave in q11 and I1 respectively.

Setting (4-128) and (4-130) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing q11 and I1 as:
qo11 =
Io1 =

−

(4-132)

)

(4-133)

(

Similarly, we can write the profit maximizing quantities for retailer 2 as:
qo12 =
Io1 =

−

(4-134)

)

(4-135)

(

Solving (4-132) and (4-134) together, we get:
qo11 = qo12 =

(4-136)

and the Io1 decision for either retailer is: Io1 =

(

)

(4-137)

We now need (4-136) and (4-137) to fulfill the constraints (4-119), (4-120), (4-121) and
(4-122).

as well as I1 >

+

.

(4-138)

since the order quantities for the two retailers are equal, (4-119) can be written as:
a-2bq11 ≥ 0
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---> q11 ≤

(4-139)

We see that (4-142) always fulfills (4-144). We now only need to check that (5-135) fulfills
qo11 > 0, which leads to the following sub-cases:
Case 1(a): If qo11(4-141) < = 0, q*11 = 0

(4-140)

Case 1(b): If qo11(4-141) > 0, q*11 = qo11 =

(4-141)

Similarly, we need that (4-142) fulfills the constraints (4-126) and (4-127).

We observe that (4-142) always fulfills (4-126). Now, for (4-142) to fulfill (4-127), we have
the following sub-cases:

Case 1(c): If Io1(4-140)≤0, I*1 = 0
Case 1(d): If Io1(4-140)>0, I*1 = Io1(5-136)=

(4-142)
(

132

)

(4-143)

Case (2): If I1 <=

+

Here, q*21 = q*22 =
and w*3 =

− , I*2 =

−

(

+ ℎ), w*2 =

, q*31 = q*32 = 0

(4-144)

Substituting the values from (4-149) into the retailer profit function over the three periods,
we get:

ПR11 + ПR21 +ПR31 =(a-b(q11+q12))(q11) – w1(q11+I1)-hI1 +
(

(

)

(

)

(4-145)

)

= a – 2bq11- bq12 - w1

(4-146)

)

(4-147)

(
(

)
(

= −2b< 0

=
)

−

(4-148)

=0

(4-149)

(4-154) proves that (4-152) is concave in q11 and I1 respectively.

Setting (4-153) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing q*11 quantity as:
qo11 =

−

(4-150)

We see from (4-155) and (4-156) that (4-155) is constant in I1. Thus,
o

=+ Infinity

Similarly, we can write for retailer 2:
qo12 =
o

−

(4-151)
(4-152)

=+ Infinity

Solving (4-150) and (4-152) together we get:
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(4-153)

q*11 = q*12 =
o

=

(4-154)

+Infinity

(4-155)

Now, we need that (4-154) and (4-155) fulfill the constraints (4-119) through (4-122) as
well as the domain condition: I1 <

+

(4-156)

Since the order quantities for the two retailers are equal, (4-119) can be written as:
a-2bq11 ≥ 0
---> q11 ≤

(4-157)

We see that (4-154) always fulfills (4-157). We now only need to check that (4-154) fulfills
qo11 > 0, which leads to the following sub-cases:

Case 2(a): If qo11(4-154) < = 0 , qo12(5-135) < = 0 , q*11 = q*12 = 0

(4-158)

Case 2(b): If qo11(4-154) > 0, q*11 = qo11 =

(4-159)

Further, since Io1=+Infinity, the I*1 that fulfills constraints (4-119) through (4-122) is the
maximum allowed by the domain conditions, i.e.,
I1 ≤

+

and 0<=I1<=

 I*1 =

+

(4-160)

Summary of 1st period retailer q*11 and q*12 decisions:
Case No.
R-S-i
R-S-ii

We can further see:

Constraints
<=0

Optimal Value
q*11=q*12 =0

>0

q*11 = q* 12 =

<=0 is infeasible since we know w1<=a, always. So, q*11 = q*12 =

is the only optimal w*1 decision.

(4-160a)

As for the I*1 decision, the two possible cases are:
In the range of the I1 domain: I1 > + ;
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If

(

)

≤ 0;

If

(

)

> 0; I*1 =

∗

=0

(4-161)
(

)

(4-162)

And in the range of the I1 domain: I1<=

+

; I*1 =

+

The final I*1 value decision depends on, in which range of the I* 1 domain, the retailer makes
a higher profit (over all the 3 selling seasons).

Note: In the profit functions below: we only check the I* 1 values since the q*11 values are
independent of the I*1 domain and will not change with the I*1 domain.
Here: q*21 = q*22 = 0, I*2 = 0 , w*2 = a and w*3 =

,

q*31 = q*32 = 0

ПR11 + ПR21 +ПR31 (I*1 = 0) = -(w1+h)I1 + a-b(2I1)(I1) = 0
ПR11 + ПR21 +ПR31 (I*1 =

(

)

(4-163)

) = (ℎ^2/(4 ∗ ) − ( ∗ ℎ)/(4 ∗ ) + ( [1] ∗ ℎ)/(2 ∗ ) +

ℎ/2 − ( [1] ∗ )/(4 ∗ ) + [1]^2/(4 ∗ ) + /2 + [1]/2)
When I*1 =

+

; q*21 = q*22 =

ПR11 + ПR21 +ПR31 (I*1 =
(

−

)(

+

)+(

+
+

− , I*2 =

−

(

(4-164)

+ ℎ), w*2 =

)=
)(

−

) −(109h^2)/1587b+(845 ∗

) − ( [1] ∗ ℎ)/(3 ∗ ) − (88 ∗ ^2)/(1587 ∗ ) − ( [1] ∗ )/(9 ∗ )

∗ ℎ)/(4761 ∗
(4-165)

Comparing profits in (4-163), (4-164) and (4-165), we see that, the retailer makes more
profit always with I*1 in the range: I1<=
 I*1=

+

+

;

is the optimal I*1 decision here.
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(4-166)

1st period manufacturer decisions
Given:

a, b, > 0

(4-180)

q11, q12, I ≥0

(4-181)

Decision variable: w1

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0≤w1≤a

The manufacturer's profit function over the three periods becomes:
+

+

=

(

+

+ 2I ) +

(

+

+ 2I ) +

(4-182)
(

+

)

(4-183)

There is only one optimal combination of w* 2, q*21,q*22, I*2, w*3 and q*31,q*32 here
Which is: I*1=
w*2 =

+

, q*11=q*12 =

; and w*3 =

, q*21 = q*22 =

+

=

−

(

+ ℎ),

, q*31 = q*32 = 0 (4-184)

substituting (4-184) into (4-183), we get:
+

− , I*2 =

(

+

+ 2I ) +

(36ℎ + (36

=

− 12 )ℎ − 144
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+ 47

(4-184)
(

)

=2*(h/(3*b)+a/(9*b))+(2*(a-w[1]))/(3*b)-(2*w[1])/(3*b)
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(4-185)

)

(

)

= -4/3b <0

(4-186)

(4-186) shows that (4-184) is concave in w1. Setting (4-185) to zero, we get the profitmaximizing wo1 decision as:
wo1 =

(4-187)

we readily see that (4-187) is >a, i.e., > than the RHS of the constraint on the w*1 value i.e.,
(4-182).

Hence, w*1 = a is the optimal w*1 decision here.

Summary of decisions - three period Cournot model:
1st period:
w*1 = a; I*1=

+

, q*11=q*12 = 0

2nd period:
q*21 = q*22 =
w*2 =

; I*2 =

−

=
−

(

+ ℎ) =

3rd period:
w*3 =

, q*31 = q*32 = 0
***
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5. 2 period Cournot duopoly with strategic inventories and vertical control
Analysis under Commitment contract

5.1 Retailer 1, 2nd period retailer decisions:
Given:

a > 0, b>0, h>0, I>0

(5-001)

0<w2<=a, 0<w1<=a

(5-002)

q22>=0

(5-004)

q11 >=0, q12>=0

(5-003

a-b(q22+2I)>=0

(5-005)

a-2bI >=0

(5-006)

Constraints:
q21>=0

(5-007)

a-b(q21+q22+2I)>=0

The 2nd period profit function for retailer 1 can be written as:
ПR21 =( − (
=

+

− (2q

+ 2I))(

+

+ )−(

)

+ 3I) −

(5-008)
(5-009)
(5-010)

= −2b < 0

(5-011)

(5-011) shows that (5-009) is concave with respect to q21

Setting (5-010) to zero, we get the profit-maximizing 2nd period order quantity for retailer
1 as:

=

−

(5-012)

We need that (5-012) fulfills (5-007) and (5-008) .
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Re-arranging (5-008), we get:
q21<= − (

+ 2I)

(5-013)

We observe that (5-012) always fulfills (5-013) and hence (5-008).

So, we now only need to check that (5-012) fulfills (5-007), which leads to the following
sub-cases for the optimal qo21 decision:
Case 4.1(a): If qo21(5-013) <=0, q*21 = 0

(5-014)

Case 4.1(b): If qo21(5-013) > 0, q*21 = qo21(3-3009) =

−

(5-015)

4.2: Retailer 2's 2nd period order quantity decisions
Given: (Assumptions)

I1, I2>=0, 0< w2< a, h>0

(5-016)

a-b (I1+I2) >= 0 OR a-2bI >=0

(5-017)

a-b(q21+I)>=0

(5-018)

Decision variables: q22

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.

a-b (q21+I1+ q22 +I2) >= 0 OR a-b(q21+q22+2I)>=0
q22 >= 0

We can write the 2nd period profit function for retailer 1 as:
ПR21 =( − (

+

+ 2I))(

+ )−(

)

(5-019)

(5-020)

(5-021)

Since retailer 2 is symmetrical to retailer 1, we can use a procedure similar to the one

employed in Section 3.11 to derive retailer 2's 2 nd period profit-maximizing order quantity
as

=

−

(5-022)
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For (5-022) to fulfill (5-019) and (5-020), we have the following two sub-cases, again, using
a procedure similar to that in Section 4.1
Case 4.2(a) If qo22(5-022) <=0, q*22 = 0

(5-023)

Case 4.2(b): If qo22(5-022) > 0, q*22 = qo22(5-022) =

−

(5-024)

4.3: Combined equilibrium analysis – q21 and q22 decisions

Since the two retailers are identical in all respects, symmetrical, in Cournot competition
with each other and take their decisions simultaneously, we can postulate that their

equilibrium 2nd period order quantities are equal. In this case, there are only two possible
equilibria:

Case 4.3 (a): qo21(5-013) <=0 AND qo22(5-022) <=0 (Case 4.1(a) and Case 4.2(a))
Here, q*21 = q*22 = 0 (From (5-014) and (5-023))

(5-025)

Here, q*21 =

(5-026)

Case 4.3 (b): qo21(5-013) >0 AND qo22(5-022) >0 (Case 4.1(b) and Case 4.2(b))

q*22 =

−

−

From (5-014)
From (5-023)

(5-027)

Solving (5-026) and (5-027) together, we obtain,
q*21 = q*22 =

−

(5-028)

Table 1. Summary of 2nd period retailer order quantity decisions
Case No. Domain Conditions
4.3(a)

Equivalent
Conditions

qo21(5-013) <=0 AND qo22(5-022)
<=0

− <= 0
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Equilibrium
Decision
(q*21,q*22)
0,0

4.3(b)

qo21(5-013) >0 AND qo22(5-022) >0

− >0

− ,
−

Since w1, and w2 are decided at the beginning of the 1st period itself, the next decision we
analyze, using the backward induction framework are the 1st period order quantity
decisions for either retailer.

4.4: 1st period retailer 1 order quantity decisions for retailer 1:
Given: (Assumptions)
a, b, h >0
(5-029)

0<= w1+h< a, 0<=w2<a

(5-030)

q12>=0

(5-031)

a-bI>=0

(5-033)

a-b(q12) >=0

(5-032)

Decision variables: q11, I

Requirement (constraints) on the decision variables.
q11 >= 0

(5-034)

a-b (q11+q12) >=0

(5-035)

a-2bI>=0

(5-037)

I >=0

(5-036)

We can write the 1st period profit function for retailer 1 as:
ПR11= ( − (

+

))(

)−

(

+ )−ℎ
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(5-038)

The 1st period problem for retailer 1 is to set a q 11 and I to maximize the sum of 1st and 2nd
period profits. i.e., retailer 1 needs to maximize:
ПR11 + ПR21

(5-039)

From Table 1, we can observe that there are two possible sub-cases here, since ПR21 is

different depending on whether (q*21,q*22) is given by Case 4.3(a) or Case 4.3(b). Hence, we
have the following two sub-cases:
Case 4.4(a):

− <= 0 OR I>=

In this case, from Table 1, q*21 = q*22= 0 and hence
ПR21 = (a-b(2I))(I)

The sum of 1st and 2nd period profits for retailer 1 hence becomes:
ПR11 + ПR21 = ( − (
(

)

(

=

)

− 2bq

+

−

))(

)−

(

+ ) − ℎ +(a-b(2I))(I)

−

)

= −(

(

)

= −4b

(5-041)
(5-042)

= −2b

(

(5-040)

(5-043)
+ ℎ) +

− 4bI

(5-044)
(5-045)

(5-043) and (5-045) show that (5-041) is concave in q11 and I respectively.

Setting (5-042) and (5-044) to zero respectively, we get the profit-maximizing q11 and I
values as:
qo11 =
Io =

(

−

(5-046)

)

(5-047)
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We now need (5-046) and (5-047) to fulfill the constraints (5-034) ~ (5-037).
Rearranging (5-035), we have:
q11<= −

(5-048)

Similarly, from (5-037), we can write:
I<=

(5-049)

We see that (5-046) and (5-047) fulfill (5-048) and (5-049) respectively.

As such, We have the following four sub-cases for the optimal q*11 decision:
Case 4.4(a-i): if qo11(5-046) <0, q*11 = 0

Case 4.4(a-ii): If qo11(5-046)>=0, q*11 = qo11(5-046) =

−

(5-050)
(5-051)

We observe that (5-047) needs to fulfill (5-036) as well as the domain condition for this
case i.e.,
I>=

(5-052)

We see if

<=0 → w2>=a.

From (5-030), we see that w2 is always < a.
→

is always >0
(

Also, we see that
also write:

(

)

(5-053)
)

<=0 → w1>=a, which again contradicts (5-030). As such, we can

>0 always

(5- 054)

From all of the above, we have the following sub-cases for the optimal I* decision:
Case 4.4(a-iv): If Io(5-047)<=
Case 4.4(a-v): If Io(5-047) >

, I* =

(5-055)

, I*= Io(5-047) =
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(

)

(5-056)

Table 2: Summary of Retailer 1's 1st period decisions:
Case No. Domain Conditions

Decision

4.4(a-ii)

q*11 =

4.4(a-i)

−

4.4(a-iii)

(

4.4(a-iv)

−

(

q*11 = 0

<0

)

>=0

I* =

<=

)

>

I* =

(

−
)

Case 4.4(b): I<=
In this case, we know from Table 1 that q* 21 = q*22 =
ПR21 = (a-b(2*

))(

)-w2(

− and hence

− )

(5-057)

The sum of 1st and 2nd period profits for retailer 1 hence becomes:
ПR11 + ПR21 = ( − (
(

)
(

=
)

− 2bq

+

))(

−

)−

(

+ )−ℎ +

(

−

)

= −(

(

)

=0

+

(5-058)
(5-059)

= −2b

(

)

(5-060)
+ ℎ) +

(5-061)
(5-062)

(5-060) shows that (5-058) is concave in q11

Setting (5-059) to zero we get the profit-maximizing q11 as:
qo11 =

−

(5-063)

(5-061) and (5-062) show that (5-058) increases linearly with increase in Io. Hence, the
profit-maximizing Io = + Infinity.
Io = + Infinity
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(5-064)

We however need that (5-063) and (5-064) fulfill the conditions (5-034)~(5-037). We see
readily that (5-063) always fulfills (5-035). Hence, we only need to check that (5-063)
fulfills (5-034), which leads to the following two cases for the optimal q* 11 decision:
Case 4.4(b-i): if qo11(5-063) <0, q*11 = 0

(5-065)

Case 4.4(b-ii): If qo11(5-063)>=0, q*11 = qo11(5-063) =

−

(5-066)

The optimal I* decision is the max. allowed by the domain conditions i.e.,
I >=0 AND I<= AND I<=
→ I* =

(5-067)

In summary, retailer 1's 1st period decisions can be written as:
q*11 decisions:

Case 4.5-S(i): If

−

Case 4.5-S(ii): If

<=0, q*11= 0

−

>0, q*11 =

(5-068)
−

(5-069)

I* decisions:
If I>=

AND

(

)

<=

If I>=

AND

(

)

>

If I<

, I* =
, I* =

(5-070)
(

)

, I*=

We observe that:

(5-071)
(5-072)

(

)

<=

→ 4w2-3w1<=a+3h

We know from (5-030) that:
0<=w2<a

(5-073)

(5-074)

0<=w1<=a

(5-075)

4*(5-075) – 3*(5-074) yields
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4w2-3w1<=a+3h, which now always holds, since (5-074) and (5-075) are given conditions.
→

(

)

<=

holds always

Thus, we can say that

(

)

(5-076)

>

This leads to the fact that I* =

is impossible and hence (5-071) is impossible.
is the only profit-maximizing I* decision that holds

always, and hence, this is the only I* decision possible.

(5-077)

4.5 Retailer 2's 1st period decisions:

From symmetry to section 4.4, we can write:
Case 4.5-S(i): If
Case 4.5-S(ii): If

−
−

<=0, q*12= 0
>0, q*12 =

(5-078)
−

and I* =

(5-079)
(5-080)

4.6: Combined equilibrium analysis - 1st period retailer decisions:
From (5-068) and (5-078), we can write: if
However, we see that,

<=0, q*11 = q*12 = 0

<=0 → a<=w1

(5-081)
(5-082)

From (5-030), we can see that (5-082) is impossible and hence the only possible q* 11, q*12
decision pair is: (From (5-069) and (5-079))
q*11 = q*12 =

(5-083)

and the only possible I* decision for either retailer is I* =

(5-084)

Substituting these back into Table 1, we see that the only optimal (q* 21, q*22) decision is:
q*21 = q*22 = 0

(5-085)
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This shows that the two retailers do not order anything in the 2 nd period, under a

Commitment contract. (and it follows that a Commitment contract structure is unable to
prevent strategic inventory carriage by the retailers).

Manufacturer's 1st and 2nd period wholesale price decisions:
Given:

a, b, > 0

(5-086)

q11, q12, I, q21, q22>=0

(5-087)

Decision variable: w1, w2

Requirement (constraints) for the decision variables.
0<=w1 +h<a
0<=w2<a

(5-088)

(5-089)

The objective of the manufacturer in the 1st period is to maximize the sum of 1st and 2nd
period profits i.e., maximize:

ПM1 + ПM2 = w1(q11+q12+2I*)+w2(q*21+q*22)

(5-089)

= w1(2*

(5-090)

(

+2*
)

(
(

)
)

(

=
=

=
)

=

)
−

(5-091)

≤0

(5-092)

−

(5-093)

≤0

(5-094)
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(5-092) and (5-094) prove that (5-089) is concave in w1 and w2 respectively. Setting (5-

091) and (5-093) to zero respectively, we get the profit-maximizing wo1 and wo2 decisions
for this case as:

wo1 = wo2 = > 0

(5-095)

We observe that (5-095) fulfills (5-089)
For (5-095) to fulfill (5-088), we need <=a OR a>=h, which usually holds. Hence, (5-095)
mostly fulfills (5-088) also.
→ w*1 = w*2 =

(5-096)

148

Summary:
w*1 = w*2 =
q*11 = q*12 =

(5-S001)
=

(5-S002)

q*21 = q*22 = 0

(5-S003)

I* =

(5-S004)

=
***
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